

Pyrrhic Victory: How Territorial Wars Affect Political Attitudes and Behavior

Anna Getmansky *

Chagai M. Weiss †

Abstract

Does war affect support for incumbent leaders and parties? The literature is divided with studies reporting negative, positive, or no-effects. Moreover, many studies analyze the consequences of foreign intervention, and far less is known about the political costs of territorial wars. We address these empirical gaps by focusing on the political costs of the Yom Kippur war—a responsive territorial war that Israel won militarily albeit at a high cost. Leveraging the unexpected onset of the war which interrupted an ongoing public opinion poll, as well as voting records from four elections linked with military fatality data, we demonstrate that the war and its casualties reduced support for incumbent parties and leaders, and increased support for the emerging opposition. By moving beyond foreign interventions and combining a host of identification strategies, we provide strong causal evidence that territorial wars are politically costly for incumbent leaders and parties.

*Department of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science. Address: Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom. Email: a.getmansky@lse.ac.uk

†University of Wisconsin - Madison. Email: cmweiss3@wisc.edu.

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Introduction

Wars can have profound political consequences for democratic leaders. Understanding these consequences, and especially how voters reward or punish elected officials for their war performance, can shed light on the circumstances under which leaders are willing to use force. That said, the existing literature does not reach a clear conclusion regarding the political effects of war. Indeed, many studies report that wars and their costs are detrimental for leaders' public support (Croco, 2011; Karol and Miguel, 2007). In contrast, theories relating to the 'rally-round-the-flag' effect (Baker and Oneal, 2001) and the 'don't let them die in vain' approach to conflict (Boettcher and Cobb, 2009), suggest that wars can increase support for incumbents. Furthermore, others argue that wars and fatalities—by themselves—do not affect support for leaders, and that instead partisanship and elite discourse shape how voters assess leaders' war performance (Berinsky, 2007). Overall, these diverging findings motivate additional empirical attention which can enhance our understanding of how wars affect political attitudes and behaviors.

We make three empirical contributions to the literature on wars and support for incumbents. First, unlike many of the previous studies that focus primarily on Western foreign interventions in territories that are far away from states' borders (e.g. Johns and Davies (2014); Boettcher and Cobb (2009); Gartner (2008); Karol and Miguel (2007); Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2006); Gartner and Segura (1998); Gartner, Segura and Wilkening (1997); Mueller (1971)), we examine the Israeli case of Yom Kippur war—a conflict that was fought close to the country's territory. In contrast to foreign interventions, public willingness to fight and sustain sacrifices is often higher in wars over a country's immediate territory because of the higher stakes involved (Toft, 2014; Johnson and Toft, 2014). However, due to the proximity to population centers, such wars may impose higher costs on the population, including exposure of many civilians to the fallout of fighting. It follows, that the effects of such close-to-home wars on incumbent support may cut both ways. Yet, the minimal attention

of previous studies to territorial wars, limits our understanding of how citizens react to such instances.

To shed light on this puzzle, we explore the effects of the Yom-Kippur war on support for Israeli incumbents. Empirically, we triangulate public opinion and voting records, to examine how the war affected attitudes towards incumbent leaders, and how conditional on war, military fatalities affected voting in home-localities of the fallen soldiers. Our results all point to one conclusion that popularly-elected leaders in Israel lost public support due to the war. This conclusion is consistent with the US-based studies on the negative effect of military fatalities in far-away wars (Karol and Miguel, 2007; Kriner and Shen, 2007; Grose and Oppenheimer, 2007). Moreover, unlike previous studies that highlight the adverse political costs of losing wars (Croco, 2011; Debs and Goemans, 2010; Chiozza and Goemans, 2004; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995), we find that even military victory can lead to a withdrawal of public support from leaders associated with the war, when the public perceives the war effort to be mismanaged.

Second, we sidestep inferential challenges which are common in the existing literature by triangulating multiple identification strategies. Our empirical approach is notable and necessary, since the decision to participate in a war is endogenous to a leader's level of political support (Oakes, 2012). Indeed, leaders may avoid military engagements that they deem to be politically costly, and thus it is not surprising that in some cases public support for leaders increases even in response to war fatalities (Koch, 2011). Furthermore, in parliamentary democracies (such as Israel), governments can trigger elections in response to successful military campaigns (Smith, 2004), imposing further challenges for causal identification.

The context of the Yom Kippur war on which we focus provides us with important analytical leverage. Specifically, the war broke out—unanticipated by the Israeli voters and most of the decision-makers—on the eve of Israeli national elections. We take advantage of the surprising timing of the war, which interrupted the fielding of the Israel National

Elections Study (INES), and compare pre- and the post-war surveys to examine how the war affected public opinion. We find that the Prime Minister's popularity dropped by over 19 percentage points amongst post-war survey respondents, compared with pre-war survey respondents. In addition, the overall support for the incumbent party dropped by over 10 percentage points after the war, whereas support for the main opposition party surged by a similar magnitude.

To complement our public opinion results, we consider whether different exposure to the costs of fighting—conditional on war—affects voting behavior. To do so, we use an originally-collected dataset, having digitalized—for the first time—locality-level election results using hard copy records from the archives of Israel's Central Election Committee. We then matched the locality-level voting records with data on the localities of origin of Israeli military fatalities. Employing a difference-in-difference design, in which we compare localities with and without 1973 military fatalities over four elections (1965-1977), we find that localities suffering from military fatalities decreased support for the incumbent party by 9 percentage points, and increased support for the opposition party by over 8 percentage points. These results complement our analysis of public opinion data, and show that in addition to the experience of war, local exposure to its costs (fatalities) has an additional impact on support for the incumbent. Overall, our results suggest that the territorial Yom-Kippur war had an immediate, significant, and long-lasting effect on political support for leaders and parties.

Finally, we contribute to the literature on the political costs of war by employing a more sensitive measurement of political consequences. Many previous studies focus on the political survival of leaders (e.g. [Croco \(2011\)](#); [Debs and Goemans \(2010\)](#); [Chiozza and Goemans \(2004\)](#); [Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson \(1995\)](#)). However, our case shows that leaders can incur political costs without immediate removal from office. Such costs are also consequential as they may involve reshuffling of senior members of the cabinet and

precede more profound shifts in leadership.¹ A more nuanced measure of political costs—using public opinion and voting data—can uncover some of the underestimated political implications of wars that remain unobserved in studies that focus on political survival.²

War and Support for Leaders

Wars can be politically costly for popularly-elected incumbents that rely on voters' support to remain in power.³ In line with this insight, [Croco \(2011\)](#) shows that leaders who initiate wars are more likely to suffer adverse political consequences if they lose them. Similarly,

¹In this case, the incumbent party won the post-war election in 1973 albeit with a smaller lead, but ultimately lost power in subsequent election in 1977. The Prime Minister resigned shortly after the victory in the post-war elections due to public pressure, but the incumbent party stayed in power for four more years.

²In a cross-national analysis, [Koch \(2011\)](#) examines the effect of fatalities on incumbent's vote-shares, but the definition of incumbent pools together votes of three major coalition partners, and examines the national-level vote-shares rather than geographically-disaggregated support for incumbent party conditional on local exposure to the costs of fighting. Our analysis suggests that for the case of Israel in Yom Kippur war, this approach underestimates the negative effect of fatalities on political support for incumbent.

³A smaller literature argues that war outcomes have a larger impact on non-democratic than on democratic leaders because the former face more detrimental personal consequences in the event of removal from office following a loss in a war ([Chiozza and Goemans, 2004](#); [Debs and Goemans, 2010](#)). In this article, we do not compare democracies to non-democracies, but rather examine the political implication of wars for popularly-elected leaders.

democratic leaders are more likely to be involved in wars earlier in the electoral cycle, and decrease their war participation closer to election periods (Gaubatz, 1991). Similarly, democracies are less likely to contribute troops to peacekeeping missions abroad before elections, in an effort to minimize political risks when electoral accountability is higher (Marinov, Nomikos and Robbins, 2015), and democracies fight weaker opponents against whom they have a higher chance of winning (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999). Indeed, democracies—especially those with military conscription—suffer from fewer war fatalities—consistent with the argument that fatalities are politically-sensitive (Vasquez, 2005).

War fatalities “are the most salient, visible, and systematic measure of a war’s cost” (Gartner, 2008, 96). Several studies—mostly based on the US experience—suggest that higher war casualties often lead to a decline in popular support for war and for the political leaders associated with it. For example, the US public support for the military involvement in Vietnam declined as a function of the logarithm of American military casualties (Mueller, 1971). Local fatalities in particular seem to matter. For example, state-level US military fatalities in the Iraq war reduced Bush’s vote-share in affected states by 2 percent in the 2004 election relative to the 2000 election (Karol and Miguel, 2007), a substantially significant effect especially in close races. Local Iraq war deaths also reduced vote-shares of Republican Senators and Representatives (Kriner and Shen, 2007; Grose and Oppenheimer, 2007). In line with these findings, other studies emphasize the recency of fatalities (Gartner, Segura and Wilkening, 1997), and the importance of trends in forming expectations about future losses (Gartner and Segura, 1998). Aside from the direct effect on public support for incumbents, fatalities can have political consequences through increased turnout in elections, by bringing to the ballot box the previously less-politically-active voters (Koch and Nicholson, 2016).

Two main mechanisms explain the negative effect of fatalities on support for leaders. The first relates to retrospective voting, whereby fatalities are a heuristic voters use to infer about the overall quality of the government (Gartner, 2008). Another mechanism suggests

that rather than holding incumbents accountable for fatalities, voters rally behind candidates that have valence in dealing with the heightened security problems (Kibris, 2011).

In contrast to the findings above, others argue that casualties' impact is conditional on contextual factors. One such factor is elite consensus about the war that makes voters more tolerant towards fatalities—as in the case of the US in the First Gulf War (Larson, 1996). Conversely, military fatalities in combination with elite disagreement, especially if the opposition objects to the war, may weaken public support for the incumbent (Arena, 2008). Elite disagreement may also lead the public to adopt partisan views regarding conflict participation, regardless of fatalities (Berinsky, 2007). In addition, individual perceptions of war—such as beliefs about the likelihood of success if the war is still ongoing—could also condition how voters interpret war deaths (Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler, 2006; Gribble et al., 2015).

Finally, war fatalities under some circumstances may increase the popular support for war and for leaders associated with it. This may happen when some voters view military casualties as an investment. Such a perspective is theorized to encourage voters' support for ongoing conflict and sustain the current course of action, in order to redeem casualties and not to let them “die in vain” (Boettcher and Cobb, 2009; Koch, 2011; Schott, Scherer and Lambert, 2011).

Taken together, these studies imply that voters may be sensitive to the costs of war, and especially to military fatalities. However, there are conflicting findings as to whether the effects of wars and their fatalities, on incumbents' political fate are positive or negative. These conflicting findings may be the result of challenges to causal identification, such as strategic selection into conflict or elections, when it is politically least costly. If such strategic selection exists, previous findings may under-estimate the negative causal effects of wars.

In addition, evidence regarding the effects of wars on support for leaders are based primarily on cases of foreign intervention in which the tolerance for costs might be lower

compared with conflicts fought over a country's immediate territory (Toft, 2014; Johnson and Toft, 2014).⁴ If that is indeed the case, then again our existing evidence from (U.S.) foreign interventions would likely under-estimate the negative impact of wars. Therefore, it remains crucial to consider the political consequences of territorial wars, which may be different or more pronounced than the political consequences of foreign interventions. In order to shed light on the political consequences of territorial war, while addressing concerns of causal identification, we turn to Israel, and the Yom Kippur war.

The Yom Kippur War and the 1973 Elections

The Yom Kippur war began with a surprise Egyptian-Syrian attack against Israel on October 6, 1973. The political and military leadership in Israel, let alone the general public, did not anticipate the war despite ample indicators of a looming threat.⁵ The main reason for the surprise was the deep-rooted belief in Israel's military and the political establishment

⁴According to the World Value Survey, countries vary greatly with respect to their citizens' willingness to fight for their country. For example, in the US—a country involved primarily in wars abroad—less than 65% of respondents in a nationally-representative survey expressed willingness to fight for their country in war. In contrast, in Israel—a country that has been involved primarily in territorial wars—75% of respondents expressed such willingness (Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. (eds.), 2014).

⁵Israel's Minister of Defense at that time, Moshe Dayan, said in an interview to Time Magazine two and a half months before the war that he did not anticipate a war in the next ten year. He reiterated this position in a public event in Israel shortly before the war (Shlaim, 1976, 362).

that Syria would not start a war without Egypt, and that Egypt was not ready to fight because it had not yet received the required offensive weapons from the Soviet Union. This belief shaped the interpretation of numerous pieces of evidence on war preparations in Egypt and Syria (McDermott and Bar-Joseph, 2017; Klagsburn, 2017; Shalev, 2010; Handel, 1977).

During 1973, Israel partially mobilized its troops in response to large-scale Egyptian maneuvers (Handel, 1977, 483). However, the financial cost of mobilization, together with alert fatigue, and the fear of self-fulfilling prophecy, deterred the government from calling up the reserves despite the mounting evidence indicating a possible attack. Israeli leaders' firm belief in the ability of their intelligence organizations to provide a sufficient alert in case of an attack further contributed to the government's unwillingness to mobilize troops in the absence of a clear alert (McDermott and Bar-Joseph, 2017).

The higher military and political echelons concluded that an attack was imminent only eleven hours before the outbreak of the war (Kam, 1988, 23). During the Army's General Staff meeting on October 5, 1973 (one day before the outbreak of the war), the head of the military intelligence corps indicated that the chances of an Egyptian or Syrian attack were "low, and even lower than low" (Aderet, 2018; McDermott and Bar-Joseph, 2017).⁶ In line with this assessment, there were no preparations for combat up until a few hours before the Syrian and Egyptian attacks (Betts, 1982, 77-78). The army revised its assessment and began preparing for war in the morning of October 6, following information received from Mossad agent Ashraf Marwan that war would begin later that day (Mintz and Schneiderman, 2018).

Even then, as late as six hours before the attack, the Israeli government decided against a preemptive strike and against mobilization of reserves for attack purposes in order not to appear aggressive in the eyes of the international community, and not to jeopardize the chances of receiving American support during war, should it break out (Druckman, 2010).

⁶The transcripts of this meeting were declassified in 2018, 45 years after the war.

The Minister of Defense Dayan vehemently opposed launching a preemptive strike, and believed that Egypt might “change their mind” about the attack in the last minute (Mintz and Schneiderman, 2018). This further underscores the surprising nature of the attack. Mobilization of reserve army personnel began four hours before the attack—not enough to deploy sufficient number of forces to stop the advancement of the Egyptian and the Syrian armies (McDermott and Bar-Joseph, 2017).

In the initial stages of the war Israel sustained heavy losses, with 724 Israeli soldiers killed in the first 36 hours (Bar-Joseph, 2005, 225). The timing of the attack—on the Jewish Day of Atonement—especially contributed to the initial setback since most of the military personnel were away from their bases and disconnected from radio and telephone.⁷ Importantly, the timing of the attack on a Jewish religious holiday was chosen to maximize the surprise and unpreparedness (Kam, 1988; Betts, 1982), and was therefore unrelated to the level of political support for the government.

Israel ultimately succeeded in pushing the opponents back—to some extent thanks to massive military assistance from the US (Eriksson, 2013, 40). Fighting ceased in the end of October. Militarily, Israel was in control of more territory than it controlled prior to the outbreak of the fighting, but the country paid a heavy toll with over 2,200 soldiers killed, and 7,251 injured. The unanticipated attack, together with the heavy initial losses in the war, traumatized many Israelis, and shook their confidence in the invincibility of the Israeli army (Eriksson, 2013, 29). In Israel, the failure to anticipate the attack is often referred to as “the blunder” (*ha-mehdal*) (Bar-Joseph, 2005, 6).

National elections—initially scheduled for October 29—were postponed to December 31 due to the war. The incumbent Labor party and Likud—the chief opposition party—were the main competitors, with the incumbent enjoying a strong lead in polls before the outbreak

⁷It is customary to abstain from using telephones other electronic devices on the Jewish Day of Atonement.

of the war (Arian, 1975). For example, in the INES survey in September—one month before the war—52% of the respondents indicated they would have voted for the Labor party if elections were held that day. This number dropped to 43% and 42% in the November and December polls, respectively. The actual Labor vote-share in the elections that were held in the end of December was 39.6% of the total vote (Knesset, 1973)—very close to what the INES polls had predicted. The economy was growing well with over 9% increase in GDP per capita in 1972, and the unemployment rate standing below 3% (International Labour Organization, 2019). Pre-war Labor campaign ads featured the incumbent Prime Minister Golda Meir and referred to the excellent security conditions in the country (Klagsburn, 2017, 609). During the war, the opposition refrained from attacking the government (Klagsburn, 2017, 640), but their post-war campaign accused the government of ‘criminal negligence’ due to the lack of preparedness.

Election results partially reflected this mood: while the incumbent party still formed the new government, with Meir continuing as the Prime Minister, Labor’s number of seats in the parliament decreased from 56 to 51, and the main opposition party’s seats increased from 32 to 39 (Knesset, 1969, 1973). However, within a month Meir resigned from her posts as the Prime Minister and the leader of the Labor party. Her resignation was prompted by the public release of the interim report of the National Inquiry Commission established to investigate the war and the events that led to it.

Although the report did not explicitly blame the government for the failure to anticipate and prepare for the attack, Meir resigned in light of the criticism voiced against her both in the general public and within her coalition. The Labor party formed another government, headed by Yitzhak Rabin. The eventual political turnover in Israel materialized only after the 1977 elections when the opposition party Likud formed the government for the first time. In the 1977 campaign, the opposition accused the incumbent government of complacency and failure to prepare properly to the war despite the available information (The National Library of Israel, 2019). Our empirical examination of the post-war political de-

velopments in Israel, which we now turn to describe, suggests that the Yom Kippur war not only imposed immediate political costs on Meir and the Labor party, but also sowed the seeds of a complete political turnover down the road.

The Effects of the Yom Kippur War on Israeli Voters

In this section, we first outline our public opinion research design and main findings. We then turn to present our empirical design and analyses of the effects of war-related military casualties on Israeli voting behavior.

Public Opinion–Empirical Strategy

The eight national Israeli elections were planned to take place in the end of October 1973. In anticipation of these elections, the INES conducted two waves of surveys – in May and in September (waves 1 and 2, respectively), polling representative samples of urban adult Jewish respondents.⁸ Following the war in October, and the election’s postponement until the end of December, the INES fielded two more surveys – in November (wave 3) and in December before the elections (wave 4), similarly interviewing a representative sample of the urban adult Jewish population. An additional survey wave was conducted in January (wave 5), and focused on post-election interviews of a similarly-representative sample.

As we explained in the introduction, participation in a war is often endogenous to domestic political support for the leader. To address the endogeneity concern, our empirical strategy for identifying how the war shaped Israeli public opinion relies on a comparison of responses to identical questions in pre-war (waves 1 and 2) and post-war surveys (waves 3 and 4). Specifically, we consider respondents participating in the pre-war surveys

⁸The urban Jewish population constituted about 76% of Israel’s population in at that time ([Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 1973](#)).

as a control group, and respondents participating in the post-war surveys as a treatment group. This strategy assumes that respondents in the control group were unaware of the upcoming war, and consequently treatment and control groups are similar in their observable and unobservable characteristics (Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno and Hernández, 2020). We substantiate the first assumption regarding the unexpected nature of the war through our qualitative exploration of this case, which suggests that the war was unexpected—at least by the individual respondents as well as some of the decision-makers in Israel. To further address the comparability of our treatment and control groups, we examine our pre- and post-war samples in the Appendix. In Table A1, we demonstrate that for the most part pre-treatment covariates are similar across both groups. However, since some slight imbalances exist in several covariates, all our models include basic demographic and political controls. More so, in a series of robustness checks, we use a nearest neighbor matching approach to compare very similar respondents in pre- and post-war samples. The post-matching results and the balance statistics are presented in our Appendix.

For our main analysis of survey data, we estimate the OLS model depicted in equation 1 to identify the effects of the war on support for political leaders and parties.

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta \times Postwar_i + \delta \times X_i + \eta_t + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

Y_i represents a response of participant i to one of the five questions relating to individual-level support for leaders and parties. α is the constant term. β represents the average treatment effect of being interviewed in one of the post-war surveys (a binary indicator $Postwar_i$). δ represents a vector of controls variables accounting for age, gender, income, education, country of origin, ethnicity, and self-reported previous voting behavior (X_i),⁹

⁹Responses to self reported previous voting behavior may be impacted by experiencing the Yom-Kippur war. If that is the case, our model may suffer from post-treatment bias. To reduce such concerns, in Table A2 of the appendix we demonstrate that our results are consistent when omitting controls for previous voting behavior.

and η_t is a survey-wave fixed effect which we employ for analyses of outcomes appearing in more than two survey waves in the treatment and the control groups (support for parties). ϵ_i is a random error term that represents the unobserved determinants of responses.¹⁰

Public Opinion–Results

In Figure 1 we report results from OLS models identifying the effects of the war on support for Israeli leaders and parties.¹¹ We consider how the war shaped citizens' appreciation of Prime Minister Meir, Minister of Defense Dayan, and Opposition Leader Begin, as well as support for the ruling party (Labor) and the main opposition party (Likud). Clearly, public support for the Israeli incumbent leaders and the Labor party dropped significantly following the war, with a decline of 19 and 10 percentage points in the favorability of the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister respectively, and a decline of over 10 percentage points for the Labor party. At the same time, the favorability of the hawkish opposition Likud Party increased by almost 10 percentage points. We do not detect a significant change in the support for the opposition leader Begin. In the Appendix, we show that these results

¹⁰Table A3 in the Appendix demonstrates that results are robust when employing Probit models. In addition, to reduce concerns that our identified effects are driven by mere cross-wave difference rather than the Yom Kippur war, we implement placebo tests comparing survey waves *within* treatment and control conditions. Table A8 in the Appendix presents results of models in which we regress support for Labor and Likud over a placebo indicator taking the value of 1 for wave 2 (4) in the pre- (post-) period. The fact that there is no significant difference between waves 1-2 (3-4) with regards to our outcome of interest, further strengthens our confidence that our main results are driven by the Yom-Kippur war, rather than mere wave differences.

¹¹Table format results are presented in the appendix (Table A2)

are robust to matching on demographic attributes of the respondents, and employing alternative model specifications.




Figure 1: **War Effects on Public Opinion**—Each point estimate and its corresponding confidence intervals represent the war’s effect on our main outcomes of interest. Leader OLS models depicted in this figure analyze respondents from waves 2 and 3 of the INES survey—one month before and after the war. The models include indicators to control for gender, age-group, income group, religiosity, education level, origin, ethnicity and self-reported vote choice in 1969. Party OLS models depicted in this figure analyze respondents from waves 1-4 of the INES survey and include similar controls as well as an additional survey wave fixed-effect.

In the Appendix (Table A10), we explore potential mechanisms which can explain our main identified effects. Specifically, we leverage two questions from the fifth wave (post-election) of the 1973 INES which asked respondents to report the main reasons for voting Likud or Labor. Based on these questions we created a series of voting rational indicators,

which we correlated with several binary outcome variables taking the value of one for respondents who reported changing their vote choice before the 1973 elections. Our models provide suggestive evidence that war-mismanagement is the only voting rational which consistently predicts self-reported vote change in 1973. We construe this as suggestive evidence that our main effects are driven by a retrospective voting mechanism by which voters punish incumbents for poor performance during the 1973 war.

Military Fatalities and Voting: Empirical Strategy

Thus far we have demonstrated that Yom Kippur war reduced public support for incumbent leaders and parties. We now turn to examine whether conditional on experiencing the war, proximity to the war's costs further exacerbated the backlash against the incumbent. To do so, we retrieved geolocated data regarding all Israeli military fatalities from 1973, as well as geographically desegregated voting records at the locality level. To ensure that our analyses are comparable with the public opinion results, we focus on urban localities.

To analyze this data, we adapt a difference-in-difference empirical strategy, estimating the effects of 1973 locality-level military fatalities on locality-level support for incumbents.¹² This strategy allows us to isolate the effect of local casualties on voting from other drivers of political behavior that are time-invariant at the locality level and that affect all localities during a certain electoral cycle. In line with the retrospective voting mechanism, we hypothesize that local military fatalities reduce support for the incumbent party and increase support for the opposition. In our preferred specification, we estimate the OLS model in equation 2:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 \times Treatment_i + \beta_2 \times Post_t + \beta_3 \times Treatment_i \times Post_t + \delta \times X_{it} + \eta_t + \epsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

Y_{it} is locality i 's vote share during election t . α is the model's constant; $Treatment_i$ is the

¹²In the appendix, we also examine the effect of military fatalities on local turnout.

indicator for localities which suffered at least one military casualty in 1973—our main measurement of treatment; $Post_t$ is the indicator for a post-war election (1973 and 1977); X_{it} is a vector of locality controls (population size, and conflict fatalities in locality i two years prior to the election); η_t denotes a linear year trend, which accounts for secular changes in party vote-shares that affect all localities; and ϵ_{it} is the locality error term. In all models we cluster standard errors at the locality level. β_3 is our main coefficient of interest that represents the difference-in-difference estimator recovering the effect of military casualties on voting behavior.

In the appendix, we present parallel trends plots to substantiate the central assumption underlying our empirical approach (Figure A2). To further test the robustness of our results, we consider alternative measurements of our treatment. These include a binary indicator for localities above the top 75th percentile of military fatalities, as well as a continuous measure of fatalities relative to eligible voters. In addition, since our main measurement of fatalities relies on locality level records of yearly military deaths, we demonstrate that our results hold when excluding deaths that did not occur during the days of the war (Tables A15-A16 in the appendix). Our results are robust to all the above alternative specifications.

Military Fatalities and Voting: Results

We report the effects of military casualties on support for the Labor and Likud parties in Figure 2.¹³ Specifically, we consider the effects of war-related fatalities on the 1973 and 1977 elections separately and combined. In line with frameworks of retrospective voting, our results suggest that support for Labor declined in localities suffering from combat deaths. This decline is statistically significant in the analysis of the 1977 election, as well as in the pooled analyses where support for Labor declined by over 9 percentage points. One reason

¹³Table format results are presented in the appendix (Table A12).

why the negative effects of fatalities on the 1973 vote is not statistically significant might relate to the report of the National Inquiry Commission which was only released following the elections. Thus, voters were not fully certain of the extent of the government's war mismanagement to change their vote, although the negative impact of the war on public support for the incumbent is already evident in the analysis of the public opinion data presented above.

In contrast to the negative effects on the incumbent Labor party, military fatalities had an immediate and lasting positive impact on the opposition party's vote-shares. This increase is statistically significant when analyzing the 1973 and the 1977 elections separately and together. Indeed, in the pooled analysis, local military fatalities cause an 8 percentage point increase in support for the Likud. In section B.6 of the appendix we further present mixed findings regarding the effects of military fatalities on local turnout. Our pooled analysis suggests that the costs of war did not have an overall effect on locality level participation in the 1973-1977 elections.

Discussion

In this research note we provide strong evidence that territorial wars have a negative causal effect on support for incumbent leaders and parties. To do so, we leverage an unexpected interruption of an ongoing public opinion survey, as well as historical records of military fatalities and locality voting behavior which allow for a difference-in-difference empirical design. By triangulating multiple data sources and identification strategies, we demonstrate that the war decreased public support for the incumbent leader by 19 percentage points, and its costs reduced incumbent party vote shares by 9 percentage points. Similarly, the war increased public support for the challenging party by almost 10 percentage points, and increased the party's vote share by 8 percentage points.

We make three contributions to the existing literature. First, we demonstrate that terri-




Figure 2: **Combatant Death Effects on Voting 1965-77** – Each point estimate and its corresponding confidence intervals represent a difference-in-difference estimator from OLS models controlling for locality level conflict victims, eligible voters, and year fixed-effects. Standard errors are clustered at the locality level.

torial wars—even if eventually victorious—are politically costly for incumbents. Indeed, our point estimate suggest that the effects of war are substantively large, and may extend well after a war is over. More so, in a multi-party context, we demonstrate that reduced support for incumbents translates into increased support for the incumbent’s main challenger.

Second, we advance on previous studies by side-stepping hurdles of causal inference, and providing an array of causal evidence regarding the effects of the war on public opinion, as well as voting behavior. In doing so, we join recent analyses of military fatalities and U.S. voting (Karol and Miguel, 2007), and provide strong evidence that wars and their costs have strong effects on both attitudes and behaviors. Lastly, by focusing on changes

in public opinion and locality level vote shares, we advance the literature on the political costs of war. Specifically, we introduce more sensitive measures that suitably capture the price that leaders pay for the conflicts in which they engage. Doing so reveals interesting and important insights: That is – in a counterfactual world without the war, or with fewer casualties, the Labor party would have likely performed better, especially given the impressive economic growth and low unemployment since the preceding elections. It follows, that an analysis of the war and its political costs, which focuses on leader survival alone, would wrongly infer that the Yom-Kippur war did not affect the incumbent leader and party since both survived in office in the aftermath of the first post-war election.

More generally, our study highlights a dilemma that democratic leaders face when they confront external military threats to their countries. Previous studies have explored the strong incentives that leaders have to exercise caution and avoid wars that are often costly and risky. Our analysis completes the picture by shedding light on the other side of this dilemma, namely the risks of unpreparedness associated with restraint and complacency. We demonstrate that avoiding troop mobilization and a preemptive strike also involves risks, even if such restraint does not lead to a military loss. Put simply, the risk of being caught unprepared needs to be weighed against the risks associated with a war.

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Pyrrhic Victory: How and Why Wars Affect Political Attitudes and Behavior

Online Appendix


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A Overview of the Data

We use surveys and voting data to estimate the effect of war on incumbent support. The attitudinal measures come from five waves of the Israel National Election Study (INES) that conducted four pre-election and one post-election surveys. The pre-election surveys were administered in May (wave 1), September (wave 2), November (wave 3), and December (wave 4). The war took place in October, and we therefore analyze waves 1-2 as pre-war and waves 3-4 as post-war surveys. We also examine the post-election survey (wave 5) that provides information on voting rationales and mechanisms driving our main identified effects.

Our voting data is comprised of urban locality-level voting results in four national elections: 1965, 1969, 1973, and 1977 which we merge with locality level data on military fatalities. The 1973 vote took place after the war, in December 1973. Figure A1 depicts the timeline of the surveys and the voting, as well as the war.

Figure A1: Surveys, Voting and War Timeline



B Main Analysis: INES Data Waves 1-4

B.1 Covariate Balance

Our study of Israeli public opinion relies on the unexpected interruption of the INES 1973 survey. In the main text, we provide qualitative evidence suggesting that survey respondents in the pre-war waves were unaware of the upcoming Yom Kippur. Therefore, we compare those respondents with post-war survey respondents which were exposed to the Yom Kippur war.

Since each wave was aimed to sample a representative sample of respondents, data from waves 1-4 results in relatively well balanced pre (wave 1-2) and post (waves 3-4) war survey samples.¹⁴ In Table A1 we report the means of key pre-treatment demographic variables. There are some differences between the pre- and the post-war waves especially with respect to age, religiosity, country of birth, and origin.

In particular, the post-war sample is somewhat younger, more likely to be born in Israel and to be of African or Asian origin. The post-war sample is also more educated and wealthier. Though statistically significant, in substantive terms, these are relatively small differences. Nonetheless we address them by employing pre-treatment controls in our main analyses, and by using nearest neighbor matching to improve the balance between the pre- and post-war samples. Matching indeed makes the samples even more similar, as we show below, in our additional analyses.

B.2 Outcome Measurement

To measure leader favorability, we analyze responses to the following question: “Which leaders would you like to see the most in election advertisements?” Possible answers include:

- 1 = Golda Meir (Prime Minister)
- 2 = Moshe Dayan (Minister of Defense)
- 3 = Menachem Begin (Opposition leader)

Using this question, we create three binary indicators (Support for Prime Minister, Support for Minister of Defense, Support for Opposition Leader) equal 1 if a respon-

¹⁴The final fifth wave of the survey was fielded following the 1973 election.

Table A1: Pre- and post-war sample balance

| Variable | Pre-war sample | | | Post-war sample | | |
|--------------------|----------------|-----------|------|-----------------|-----------|------|
| | Mean | Std. Dev. | N | Mean | Std. Dev. | N |
| Female | 0.549 | 0.498 | 2433 | 0.575 | 0.495 | 1171 |
| Age group | 3.004 | 1.353 | 2417 | 2.631 | 1.398 | 1164 |
| Religiosity | 2.842 | 0.965 | 2410 | 2.94 | 0.985 | 1145 |
| Household income | 4.264 | 2.118 | 2239 | 4.279 | 2.089 | 1091 |
| Education | 2 | 0.896 | 2423 | 2.073 | 0.924 | 1161 |
| Born in Israel | 0.23 | 0.421 | 2429 | 0.359 | 0.48 | 1162 |
| Africa/Asia origin | 0.296 | 0.456 | 2429 | 0.313 | 0.464 | 1162 |

The pre-war surveys were conducted in May and in September. The post-war surveys were conducted in November and December. Female is a binary indicator of whether a respondent is a female. Age group is an ordinal variable on 1-5 scale (1=20-29; 2=30-39; 3=40-49; 4=50-64; 5=65 or older). Religiosity is an ordinal variable on 1-4 scale (1=observes thoroughly; 2=observes to a great extent; 3=observes to some extent; 4=does not observe). Household income (monthly, in Israeli liras) is measured on an ordinal scale 1-7 (1=0-599; 2=600-799; 3=800-999; 4=1,000-1,249; 5=1,250-1,499; 6=1,500-1,749; 7=1,750 or higher). Education is measured on an ordinal scale 1-4 (1=0-8 years of schooling; 2=9-12 years of schooling; 3=>12 years of schooling, but less than a college degree; 4=college degree or higher). Born in Israel is a binary indicator of whether a respondent was born in Israel or abroad. Africa/Asia origin is a binary indicator of whether a respondent or his/her father was born in Africa or in Asia (excluding Israel). The number of respondents varies because of missing answers to some questions.

dent mentions the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, and the opposition leader, respectively, as figures they would like to see in campaign advertisements. This survey item appears in one pre-war survey (wave 2 conducted in September 1973) and in one post-war survey (wave 3 conducted in November 1973), allowing us to compare favorability shortly before and after the war (October).

To measure support for political parties, we use the question that asks *"Which party do you intend to vote for in the upcoming elections?"* Recoding this item we create two binary indicators used in our main analyses:

- Support for Labor¹⁵
- Support for Likud

Finally, in the appendix we consider the effects of war on intention to vote. To do so, we generated two variables relating to (i) individual level intention to vote, and (ii) perceived value in voting. Our first variable Intend to Vote is based on a survey item

¹⁵referred to in the survey as Alignment.

directly asking respondents whether they intend to vote. Our second variable *Important to Vote* is based on a survey item which asks respondents whether it is important to vote. Original responses ranged on a scale from 1 (not important) to 4 (very important), which we converted to a scale ranging from 0-1. This latter question regarding the importance of voting appears in all the waves, except for the September wave. These outcomes are explored in the appendix, but are not analyzed in the main text.

B.3 Regression Results and Robustness Checks

In Table A2, we report our main results visualized in Figure 1 of the main text. Tables A3-A4 display the robustness of our main public opinion results to alternative modeling specification. Specifically, in Table A3 we demonstrate that employing Probit rather than OLS models does not substantively change our findings. In Table A4, we further show that our results remain robust when omitting a battery of political controls relating to pre-war self reported voting in 1969. This serves to reduce concerns that incorporating self-reported voting in 1969 introduces post-treatment bias to our models.

B.4 Matching

We use nearest-neighbor matching to address the possibility that the results are driven by the imbalances between the pre- and the post-war samples. In particular, we match on demographic characteristics – gender, age, income, education, country of birth, and origin in Asia or Africa. Tables A5-A6 present the average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) in the matched sample (the effect of being in the post-war sample for those interviewed post war). Average treatment effects (ATE) are substantively very similar. The results are comparable to the main results we report in Table 1 and Figure 1 of the main text. Specifically, those interviewed after the war exhibit lower support for the incumbent leaders, lower willingness to vote for the incumbent party, and greater willingness to vote for the opposition party. Matching also resulted in substantially more balanced samples, as shown in Table A7.

B.5 Placebo Test

To ensure that our main results are not driven by the mere comparison of responses across different waves in the 1973 INES data, we adapt a placebo test. To do so, we generate a placebo indicator for the pre-war survey which takes a value of zero if respondents par-

ticipated in the first pre-war survey wave, and a value of one if respondents participated in the second pre-war survey wave. Similarly, we create a post-war placebo indicator to differentiate between respondents participating in wave three and four of the post-war survey. Our expectation is that placebo variables should have a null effect on our outcomes of interest.¹⁶

Table A8 presents results from our Placebo test. As expected, the placebo indicators do not have an effect on our outcomes of interest. Indeed, the coefficients from models 1-4, are statistically insignificant. These null results, enhance our confidence that the Yom-Kippur war rather than other differences across waves drive our main findings.

B.6 Turnout

Table A9 reports the effects of the war on self-reported turnout outcomes. It appears that post-war respondents are less-likely to self-report intentions to vote. As depicted in the third column of Table A9, this finding is robust to focusing on a shorter temporal bandwidth surrounding the war (i.e. a comparison of waves 2-3). Nonetheless, when asked about the importance of voting in the 1973 elections, post-war respondents seem to place more importance on political participation, when compared with pre-war survey respondents. These results together with the mixed findings in our analyses of voting data, lead us to consider the effects of war on turnout to be inconclusive.

C Analyses of Mechanisms: INES Data Wave 5

To shed light on the mechanism driving changes in support for leaders and parties following the War, we leverage a final post-election survey wave. In this fifth wave respondents were asked: *“People have brought up different reasons to vote for Likud (Labor). Below is a list of possible reasons, what are the three most convincing ones for you? What are the two least convincing ones?”* Following this question, respondents were presented with 15 different reasons.

Suggested reasons to vote for Likud, include:

¹⁶We focus on support for parties, since items relating to support for leaders were only embedded in waves 2-3, limiting our ability to compare respondents within treatment (control) conditions.

- The Alignment failed in social and economic issues
- The Likud won't give up territories
- Alignment leaders aren't trustworthy
- The Alignment is responsible for the setbacks of the war
- The Likud will know how to take a strong front in the Geneva conference
- The Alignment doesn't have a clear foreign and security policy
- The Likud has better leaders to offer
- The Likud proposes a national unity government

Suggested reasons to vote for Labor include:

- The Alignment has experience in government
- The Alignment is the least of all evils
- The Alignment might succeed in bringing peace
- Apprehension about the Likud extremism
- The Alignment can take care of socio-economic problems
- The Alignment proposes good leaders
- Fear of sudden changes in the country

Our survey data includes variables for all the voting rationals noted above, which take a value of one when respondent selected a specific rational as one of three main reasons to vote for Likud (Labor). We employ these variables in Tables [A10-A11](#), and correlate them with three different measures of self reported vote change. Results from these exploratory analyses demonstrate that respondents who reported changing their vote decision around the Yom Kippur war were more likely to report the incumbent party's mismanagement of the war effort as a central voting rational. There are no other significant and consistent differences in so far as voting rationals are concerned, between those who reported that the war had made them change their vote decision, and those who said they had not been affected by the war. Importantly, there is no difference in the evaluation of Likud leader competence or international resolve between those who had changed their vote due to

the war and those who hadn't. These findings are in line with the retrospective voting (accountability) mechanism that explains the negative effect of war on support for leaders, and they do not support the valence account. This implies that it is not necessary for voters to perceive the opposition as more competent in order to hold the incumbent accountable for costly outcomes.

D Military Fatalities and Voting

D.1 Parallel Trends


In figure A2 we plot the average vote share of Labor and Likud, across our treated and controlled localities over 4 election cycles (1965-1977). For our difference-in-difference design to be valid, we need to identify a parallel trend at the pre-treatment period (1965-1969). Indeed, as depicted in the right and left panels of Figure A2 there is a relatively parallel trend in our data. Specifically, it is evident that between 1965 and 1969, Labor vote share was declining in both treated and controlled localities. Similarly, we see that between 1965 and 1969 Likud vote share was rising in both treated and controlled localities, although the increase may be slightly larger amongst our treatment group. In both cases we see that since 1973 and onwards, the voting trajectories of treated and controlled localities diverge substantially, and this is the divergence which we pick up in our main difference-in-difference analyses.

D.2 Alternative Specification of Treatments

In Table A12 we present the full models visualized in Figure 2 of the main text. In these models, we measure treatment as a binary indicator taking a value of 1 for localities suffering from fatalities. However, in Tables A13-A14 we consider alternative measurement strategies for locality level military fatalities. Specifically, in Table A13 only localities which are in the top 75 percentile of military fatalities (or higher) receive a treatment value of one. In Table A14 we consider a continuous measure of fatalities relative to eligible voters. As depicted in Tables A13-A14, both alternative measurement strategies result in substantively similar effects, though in in Table A13 the magnitude of our effect decreases.

Our fatality data is based on yearly locality level records of military deaths. To ensure that pre or post war deaths are not driving our effects, we collected from the ministry of defense online registries additional individual level-data on deaths before October 6 and

Figure A2: Parallel Trends of Labor and Likud Vote Share



after October 25. Using this data, we create two additional measurements of our treatment. To do so we subtract from our yearly locality level counts all local deaths occurring (i) prior to the Yom Kippur war, and (ii) before or after the Yom Kippur war. We employ these alternative measures in Tables A15-A16. Our results demonstrate that using these alternative measures does not change our findings.

D.3 Turnout

Lastly, in Table A17 we present models estimating the Yom Kippur war's effect on turnout. Our pooled analyses demonstrate that military casualties do not have a statistically significant effect on turnout. However, when analyzing the data by cycle, we find that fatalities had a negative effect on turnout in 1973, and a positive effect on turnout in 1977. These mixed findings, in line with mixed evidence from our analyses of public opinion data, limit our ability to make strong claims regarding the effects of war on turnout.

Table A2: War Effects on Support for Leaders and Parties

| War Effects on Leaders | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | Prime Minister (OLS) | Min of Def (OLS) | Opposition Lead (OLS) | Labor (OLS) | Likud (OLS) |
| Post-War | -0.194*** (0.033) | -0.099*** (0.031) | 0.027 (0.030) | -0.102*** (0.020) | 0.097*** (0.019) |
| Female | 0.047 (0.029) | -0.030 (0.028) | -0.027 (0.027) | 0.003 (0.014) | -0.010 (0.013) |
| Age 30-39 | -0.016 (0.043) | 0.030 (0.041) | -0.044 (0.040) | 0.029 (0.022) | -0.056*** (0.021) |
| Age 40-49 | 0.002 (0.047) | 0.040 (0.044) | -0.127*** (0.043) | 0.103*** (0.022) | -0.107*** (0.022) |
| Age 50-64 | 0.081* (0.049) | -0.041 (0.046) | -0.112** (0.045) | 0.109*** (0.023) | -0.114*** (0.022) |
| Age 65+ | 0.126** (0.061) | -0.047 (0.058) | -0.162*** (0.057) | 0.125*** (0.028) | -0.118*** (0.027) |
| Observes to a great extent | -0.086 (0.060) | 0.051 (0.057) | 0.057 (0.056) | 0.029 (0.027) | 0.012 (0.027) |
| Observes to a small extent | -0.085 (0.054) | 0.070 (0.051) | 0.028 (0.050) | 0.041 (0.026) | 0.036 (0.025) |
| Does not observe at all | -0.149*** (0.057) | 0.051 (0.054) | 0.030 (0.053) | 0.026 (0.027) | 0.021 (0.026) |
| Income 600-799 | 0.085 (0.057) | -0.037 (0.054) | 0.082 (0.053) | 0.016 (0.027) | -0.014 (0.027) |
| Income 800-999 | 0.028 (0.059) | -0.054 (0.055) | 0.165*** (0.054) | 0.019 (0.028) | -0.002 (0.027) |
| Income 1,000-1,249 | 0.123** (0.058) | -0.071 (0.055) | 0.041 (0.054) | 0.021 (0.026) | -0.004 (0.026) |
| Income 1,250-1,499 | -0.010 (0.063) | 0.038 (0.060) | 0.007 (0.058) | 0.039 (0.029) | -0.016 (0.029) |
| Income 1,500-1,749 | 0.003 (0.070) | -0.147** (0.066) | 0.092 (0.065) | -0.001 (0.030) | -0.021 (0.029) |
| Income 1,750+ | 0.036 (0.059) | 0.005 (0.056) | 0.036 (0.055) | 0.000 (0.027) | 0.016 (0.026) |
| 9-12 yrs of schooling | -0.068* (0.036) | -0.077** (0.034) | 0.040 (0.033) | -0.036** (0.017) | 0.005 (0.016) |
| +12yrs, but less than college | -0.130*** (0.048) | -0.120*** (0.045) | -0.010 (0.044) | -0.020 (0.023) | -0.031 (0.022) |
| College degree | -0.087 (0.060) | -0.046 (0.056) | -0.040 (0.055) | -0.001 (0.029) | -0.041 (0.029) |
| Born in Israel | -0.011 (0.035) | 0.003 (0.033) | -0.033 (0.033) | -0.041** (0.017) | 0.029* (0.017) |
| Origin in Asia or Africa | -0.032 (0.035) | -0.033 (0.033) | 0.138*** (0.033) | -0.011 (0.017) | 0.046*** (0.016) |
| maarach69 | -0.180 (0.192) | 0.079 (0.181) | 0.050 (0.177) | 0.911*** (0.216) | 0.074 (0.210) |
| likud69 | -0.424** (0.194) | 0.043 (0.183) | 0.321* (0.179) | 0.131 (0.216) | 0.859*** (0.210) |
| didntvote69 | -0.304 (0.196) | 0.080 (0.185) | 0.118 (0.181) | 0.504** (0.217) | 0.309 (0.211) |
| indeplib69 | -0.323 (0.204) | 0.052 (0.193) | 0.100 (0.189) | 0.178 (0.218) | 0.111 (0.212) |
| religious69 | -0.412** (0.199) | 0.133 (0.188) | 0.112 (0.184) | 0.065 (0.217) | 0.056 (0.211) |
| left69 | -0.287 (0.221) | -0.089 (0.208) | 0.070 (0.204) | 0.364 (0.224) | 0.112 (0.218) |
| other69 | | | | 0.066 (0.234) | -0.036 (0.228) |
| survey=2 | | | | 0.014 (0.022) | -0.011 (0.021) |
| survey=3 | | | | -0.028 (0.024) | 0.001 (0.023) |
| Constant | 0.684*** (0.212) | 0.210 (0.200) | -0.011 (0.196) | -0.100 (0.218) | 0.045 (0.213) |
| Observations | 723 | 723 | 723 | 2123 | 2125 |

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Regressions regarding leader favorability analyze responses from waves 2 and 3 of the NES survey, whereas regressions regarding party support analyze results from waves 1-4 and include survey wave fixed effects.

Table A3: Main Results Wave 1-4: Robustness to Probit Specification

| War Effects on Leaders | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | Prime Minister (Probit) | Min of Def (Probit) | Opposition Lead (Probit) | Labor (Probit) | Likud (Probit) |
| Post-War | -0.501*** (0.098) | -0.517*** (0.101) | 0.153 (0.110) | -0.099*** (0.030) | 0.097*** (0.028) |
| Female | 0.075 (0.101) | -0.075 (0.104) | -0.059 (0.109) | 0.034* (0.020) | -0.019 (0.019) |
| Age 30-39 | -0.002 (0.158) | 0.214 (0.150) | -0.182 (0.147) | 0.083*** (0.032) | -0.111*** (0.029) |
| Age 40-49 | 0.042 (0.159) | 0.083 (0.155) | -0.470*** (0.162) | 0.177*** (0.032) | -0.188*** (0.030) |
| Age 50-64 | 0.372** (0.160) | -0.134 (0.169) | -0.623*** (0.179) | 0.237*** (0.033) | -0.251*** (0.031) |
| Age 65+ | 0.342* (0.200) | -0.177 (0.217) | -0.467** (0.226) | 0.279*** (0.040) | -0.236*** (0.038) |
| Observes to a great extent | -0.057 (0.191) | -0.016 (0.208) | 0.212 (0.206) | 0.216*** (0.038) | 0.103*** (0.035) |
| Observes to a small extent | 0.039 (0.163) | 0.143 (0.177) | 0.064 (0.179) | 0.353*** (0.032) | 0.108*** (0.029) |
| Does not observe at all | -0.291* (0.177) | 0.047 (0.187) | -0.033 (0.191) | 0.351*** (0.034) | 0.079** (0.031) |
| Income 600-799 | 0.316 (0.193) | 0.062 (0.209) | 0.250 (0.210) | 0.013 (0.040) | 0.006 (0.038) |
| Income 800-999 | 0.130 (0.201) | 0.048 (0.211) | 0.395* (0.213) | 0.004 (0.041) | 0.063* (0.038) |
| Income 1,000-1,249 | 0.380* (0.196) | -0.003 (0.211) | 0.020 (0.218) | 0.058 (0.039) | -0.002 (0.036) |
| Income 1,250-1,499 | 0.053 (0.217) | 0.278 (0.220) | -0.075 (0.245) | 0.076* (0.043) | -0.004 (0.040) |
| Income 1,500-1,749 | 0.096 (0.239) | -0.259 (0.264) | 0.308 (0.251) | 0.019 (0.045) | 0.018 (0.042) |
| Income 1,750+ | 0.146 (0.204) | 0.269 (0.212) | 0.011 (0.223) | -0.009 (0.040) | 0.082** (0.037) |
| 9-12 yrs of schooling | -0.216* (0.119) | -0.331*** (0.124) | 0.191 (0.129) | -0.060** (0.025) | -0.015 (0.023) |
| +12yrs, but less than college | -0.405** (0.172) | -0.557*** (0.182) | -0.042 (0.187) | -0.057* (0.034) | -0.066** (0.032) |
| College degree | -0.413** (0.206) | -0.346* (0.205) | -0.193 (0.243) | -0.072* (0.043) | -0.106*** (0.040) |
| Born in Israel | -0.173 (0.129) | 0.039 (0.125) | -0.082 (0.126) | -0.079*** (0.025) | 0.075*** (0.024) |
| Origin in Asia or Africa | -0.231* (0.122) | -0.092 (0.124) | 0.598*** (0.124) | -0.053** (0.025) | 0.116*** (0.023) |
| survey=2 | | | | -0.059** (0.029) | 0.050* (0.027) |
| survey=3 | | | | -0.007 (0.036) | 0.019 (0.033) |
| Constant | -0.570** (0.279) | -0.580** (0.293) | -1.258*** (0.305) | 0.159*** (0.054) | 0.279*** (0.050) |
| Observations | 986 | 986 | 986 | 2263 | 2265 |

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Regressions regarding leader favorability analyze responses from waves 2 and 3 of the INES survey, whereas regressions regarding party support analyze results from waves 1-4 and include survey wave fixed effects.

Table A4: Main Results Wave 1-4: Omitting 1969 Self-Reported Vote Choice

| War Effects on Leaders | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | Prime Minister (OLS) | Min of Def (OLS) | Opposition Lead (OLS) | Labor (OLS) | Likud (OLS) |
| Post-War | -0.134*** (0.026) | -0.125*** (0.024) | 0.036 (0.023) | -0.099*** (0.030) | 0.097*** (0.028) |
| Female | 0.020 (0.026) | -0.020 (0.024) | -0.013 (0.023) | 0.034* (0.020) | -0.019 (0.019) |
| Age 30-39 | -0.002 (0.038) | 0.052 (0.036) | -0.046 (0.034) | 0.083*** (0.032) | -0.111*** (0.029) |
| Age 40-49 | 0.009 (0.039) | 0.018 (0.037) | -0.113*** (0.035) | 0.177*** (0.032) | -0.188*** (0.030) |
| Age 50-64 | 0.103** (0.041) | -0.037 (0.039) | -0.137*** (0.037) | 0.237*** (0.033) | -0.251*** (0.031) |
| Age 65+ | 0.090* (0.052) | -0.051 (0.049) | -0.111** (0.047) | 0.279*** (0.040) | -0.236*** (0.038) |
| Observes to a great extent | -0.017 (0.050) | -0.000 (0.048) | 0.047 (0.045) | 0.216*** (0.038) | 0.103*** (0.035) |
| Observes to a small extent | 0.005 (0.043) | 0.036 (0.041) | 0.017 (0.039) | 0.353*** (0.032) | 0.108*** (0.029) |
| Does not observe at all | -0.071 (0.045) | 0.012 (0.042) | -0.003 (0.040) | 0.351*** (0.034) | 0.079** (0.031) |
| Income 600-799 | 0.082 (0.050) | 0.012 (0.048) | 0.056 (0.045) | 0.013 (0.040) | 0.006 (0.038) |
| Income 800-999 | 0.035 (0.051) | 0.011 (0.048) | 0.099** (0.046) | 0.004 (0.041) | 0.063* (0.038) |
| Income 1,000-1,249 | 0.102** (0.051) | -0.006 (0.048) | 0.005 (0.046) | 0.058 (0.039) | -0.002 (0.036) |
| Income 1,250-1,499 | 0.012 (0.055) | 0.066 (0.052) | -0.016 (0.049) | 0.076* (0.043) | -0.004 (0.040) |
| Income 1,500-1,749 | 0.024 (0.060) | -0.048 (0.056) | 0.067 (0.054) | 0.019 (0.045) | 0.018 (0.042) |
| Income 1,750+ | 0.034 (0.051) | 0.065 (0.048) | 0.008 (0.046) | -0.009 (0.040) | 0.082** (0.037) |
| 9-12 yrs of schooling | -0.064** (0.031) | -0.080*** (0.030) | 0.041 (0.028) | -0.060** (0.025) | -0.015 (0.023) |
| +12yrs, but less than college | -0.110** (0.043) | -0.127*** (0.040) | -0.007 (0.038) | -0.057* (0.034) | -0.066** (0.032) |
| College degree | -0.107** (0.051) | -0.078 (0.048) | -0.037 (0.046) | -0.072* (0.043) | -0.106*** (0.040) |
| Born in Israel | -0.036 (0.031) | 0.008 (0.029) | -0.017 (0.028) | -0.079*** (0.025) | 0.075*** (0.024) |
| Origin in Asia or Africa | -0.061* (0.031) | -0.024 (0.029) | 0.154*** (0.028) | -0.053** (0.025) | 0.116*** (0.023) |
| survey=2 | | | | -0.059** (0.029) | 0.050* (0.027) |
| survey=3 | | | | -0.007 (0.036) | 0.019 (0.033) |
| Constant | 0.296*** (0.072) | 0.277*** (0.068) | 0.115* (0.064) | 0.159*** (0.054) | 0.279*** (0.050) |
| Observations | 986 | 986 | 986 | 2263 | 2265 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

The first three regressions analyzing leader support employ data from waves 2-3, whereas the latter two regressions analyzing party support employ data from waves 1-4 and therefore they include wave fixed-effects. The questions on support for leaders appear only in waves 2-3, whereas the questions on support for parties appear in all waves.

Table A5: War Effects on Leaders: Matching to Address Imbalances

| ATT – matched samples (probit model) | | | |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| | Prime Minister | Min of Defense | Opposition Lead |
| ATT-Post-war vs Pre-war | -0.138*** (0.034) | -0.113*** (0.036) | 0.051 (0.027) |
| Observations | 986 | 986 | 986 |

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A6: War Effects on Parties: Matching to Address Imbalances

| ATT – matched samples (probit model) | | |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | Labor | Likud |
| ATT-Post-war vs Pre-war | -0.111*** (0.029) | 0.103*** (0.028) |
| Observations | 2263 | 2265 |

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A7: Pre and Post War Survey Respondent Demographics - Matching

| Variable | <i>Standartized differences</i> | | <i>Variance ratio</i> | |
|---|---------------------------------|------------|-----------------------|------------|
| | Pre-match | Post Match | Pre-match | Post Match |
| War Effects on Leaders | | | | |
| Female | -0.076 | 0.010 | 1.019 | 1.001 |
| Age | -0.243 | 0 | 1.045 | 1.004 |
| Religiosity | 0.020 | -0.013 | 1.142 | 1.235 |
| Income | -0.144 | -0.045 | 1.010 | 1.057 |
| Education | 0.043 | 0.026 | 1.028 | 1.076 |
| Born in Israel | 0.235 | 0.004 | 1.236 | 1.002 |
| Asia / Africa origin | 0.085 | 0 | 1.070 | 1 |
| Pre-matching: N=986 (396 pre-war; 590 post-war) | | | | |
| Post-matching: N=1180 (590 pre-war; 590 post-war) | | | | |
| War Effects on Parties | | | | |
| Female | 0.061 | 0 | 0.992 | 1 |
| Age | -0.293 | -0.016 | 1.059 | 1.017 |
| Religiosity | 0.041 | -0.001 | 1.087 | 1.030 |
| Income | -0.024 | -0.006 | 0.986 | 1.069 |
| Education | -0.013 | 0.021 | 1.010 | 1.032 |
| Born in Israel | 0.287 | 0 | 1.268 | 1 |
| Asia / Africa origin | 0.119 | 0 | 1.094 | 1 |
| Pre-matching: N=2265 (1572 pre-war; 693 post-war) | | | | |
| Post-matching: N=1386 (693 pre-war; 693 post-war) | | | | |

This table compares standartized differences in means and variance in raw (pre-matching) and balanced datasets. The treatment and the control groups are more similar (Exhibit fewer differences) in the balanced dataset. For the leaders questions, there are more respondents in post-war surveys than in pre-war ones, and the preprocessing resulted in matching one control observation to several treatment respondents. In the questions on party support, there are more pre-war respondents than post-war, and the preprocessing resulted in dropping of some control (pre-war) respondents for whom there was no good match in the treatment group. Propensity score matching results in very similar estimation of the treatment effect and in similar balance.

Table A8: Placebo Test

| Placebo Test | | | | |
|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| | Labor | Likud | Labor | Likud |
| Pre-War Placebo | 0.194 (0.166) | -0.188 (0.186) | | |
| Post-War Placebo | | | 0.130 (0.127) | -0.020 (0.119) |
| Constant | -5.702 (197.049) | -4.309 (123.633) | -1.312** (0.579) | -0.629 (0.529) |
| Observations | 1440 | 1440 | 620 | 674 |

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

The first two (last two) columns include respondents from waves 1-2 (3-4). All regressions include indicators to control for gender, age group, income group, education level, origin, place of birth, and pre-war vote choice.

Table A9: War Effects on Turnout

| Turnout Intentions | | | | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------|
| | Intend to Vote (OProbit) | Intend to Vote (OLS) | Intend to Vote (OLS: Waves 2-3) | Important to Vote (Oprobit) | Important to Vote (OLS) |
| Post-War | -0.637*** (0.059) | -0.076*** (0.007) | -0.031* (0.018) | 0.207*** (0.065) | 0.060*** (0.015) |
| Constant | | 0.909*** (0.018) | 0.875*** (0.108) | | 0.550*** (0.031) |
| Observations | 3132 | 3132 | 744 | 1623 | 2579 |

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

The first two columns analyze respondents from waves 1-4. Column three analyzes responses from waves 2-3, and columns four-five analyze respondents from waves 1,2, and 4. All regressions include indicators to control for gender, age group, income group, education level, religiosity, origin, and place of birth

Table A10: Determinants of Vote change in 1973 (OLS)

| Determinants of Vote Change | Change Since | Change After | Change During |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | 1969 (OLS) | War (OLS) | War (OLS) |
| The War was Labor's Fault | 0.062** (0.028) | 0.058** (0.029) | 0.056** (0.026) |
| Labor Economic Failure | 0.028 (0.028) | 0.043 (0.029) | 0.019 (0.027) |
| Likud is Committed to Territories | 0.002 (0.028) | 0.011 (0.030) | 0.008 (0.027) |
| No Trust in Labor | 0.042 (0.032) | 0.040 (0.034) | 0.005 (0.031) |
| Likud will Maintain Resolve in Geneva | 0.033 (0.035) | 0.017 (0.036) | -0.013 (0.033) |
| Labor Lacks Foreign Policy | 0.068** (0.030) | 0.022 (0.031) | -0.011 (0.029) |
| Likud Leader Quality | 0.034 (0.036) | 0.051 (0.038) | 0.013 (0.035) |
| Likud will create Nationalist Gov | 0.012 (0.028) | 0.013 (0.029) | -0.035 (0.027) |
| Labor Experience | -0.048* (0.028) | -0.028 (0.030) | 0.024 (0.027) |
| Labor best Option | -0.028 (0.029) | -0.011 (0.030) | 0.006 (0.028) |
| Labor will Promote Peace | -0.013 (0.027) | -0.031 (0.029) | 0.020 (0.026) |
| Likud is Extreme | 0.021 (0.028) | 0.001 (0.030) | 0.021 (0.027) |
| Labor Economic Policy | -0.041 (0.037) | -0.049 (0.039) | 0.027 (0.036) |
| Labor Leader Quality | 0.083** (0.034) | 0.009 (0.036) | -0.029 (0.033) |
| Fear of Change | 0.001 (0.029) | -0.031 (0.030) | 0.035 (0.028) |
| Constant | -0.209 (0.349) | -0.318 (0.365) | 0.452 (0.335) |
| Observations | 1084 | 1084 | 1084 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

All regressions include indicators to control for gender, education, age, income, religiosity, locality, and father's origin.

Table A11: Determinants of Vote Change in 1973 (Probit)

| Determinants of Vote Change | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| | Change Since 1969 (Probit) | Change Since 1969 (OLS) | Change After War (Probit) | Change After War (OLS) | Change During War (Probit) | Change During War (OLS) |
| Labor Fault | 0.234** (0.103) | 0.062** (0.028) | 0.235** (0.102) | 0.058** (0.029) | 0.246** (0.108) | 0.056** (0.026) |
| Labor Econ Fail | 0.102 (0.103) | 0.028 (0.028) | 0.170* (0.102) | 0.043 (0.029) | 0.080 (0.107) | 0.019 (0.027) |
| Likud Territory Commit | 0.004 (0.107) | 0.002 (0.028) | 0.068 (0.104) | 0.011 (0.030) | 0.033 (0.110) | 0.008 (0.027) |
| No Trust Labor | 0.174 (0.117) | 0.042 (0.032) | 0.175 (0.115) | 0.040 (0.034) | 0.056 (0.122) | 0.005 (0.031) |
| Likud Resolve Geneva | 0.113 (0.128) | 0.033 (0.035) | 0.070 (0.126) | 0.017 (0.036) | -0.041 (0.133) | -0.013 (0.033) |
| No FP Labor | 0.243** (0.109) | 0.068** (0.030) | 0.090 (0.109) | 0.022 (0.031) | -0.033 (0.116) | -0.011 (0.029) |
| Likud Leader Quality | 0.148 (0.134) | 0.034 (0.036) | 0.213 (0.130) | 0.051 (0.038) | 0.075 (0.139) | 0.013 (0.035) |
| Likud Nationalist Gov | 0.073 (0.103) | 0.012 (0.028) | 0.083 (0.102) | 0.013 (0.029) | -0.110 (0.109) | -0.035 (0.027) |
| Labor Experience | -0.178* (0.105) | -0.048* (0.028) | -0.116 (0.102) | -0.028 (0.030) | 0.118 (0.112) | 0.024 (0.027) |
| Labor best Option | -0.121 (0.107) | -0.028 (0.029) | -0.064 (0.104) | -0.011 (0.030) | 0.021 (0.111) | 0.006 (0.028) |
| Labor Peace | -0.042 (0.101) | -0.013 (0.027) | -0.108 (0.099) | -0.031 (0.029) | 0.121 (0.109) | 0.020 (0.026) |
| Likud Extreme | 0.089 (0.105) | 0.021 (0.028) | -0.003 (0.103) | 0.001 (0.030) | 0.104 (0.113) | 0.021 (0.027) |
| Labor Economics | -0.161 (0.142) | -0.041 (0.037) | -0.188 (0.137) | -0.049 (0.039) | 0.100 (0.143) | 0.027 (0.036) |
| Labor Leader Quality | 0.311** (0.121) | 0.083** (0.034) | 0.039 (0.122) | 0.009 (0.036) | -0.102 (0.135) | -0.029 (0.033) |
| Fear of Change | 0.002 (0.106) | 0.001 (0.029) | -0.118 (0.103) | -0.031 (0.030) | 0.174 (0.111) | 0.035 (0.028) |
| Constant | -2.087** (0.912) | -0.209 (0.349) | -1.259 (0.962) | -0.318 (0.365) | -0.315 (1.237) | 0.452 (0.335) |
| Observations | 1076 | 1084 | 1068 | 1084 | 1067 | 1084 |

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

All regressions include indicators to control for gender, education, age, income, locality, religiosity, and father's origin.

Table A12: Military Casualties and Voting – Main Results

| 73' Casualties and Voting 1969-77 | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | Likud Pooled | Likud Pooled Controls | Likud 1973 | Likud 1977 | Labor Pooled | Labor Pooled Controls | Labor 1973 | Labor 1977 |
| Casualties in 73' | 17.171*** (1.255) | 16.680*** (1.300) | 16.584*** (1.301) | 16.665*** (1.300) | 27.062*** (2.501) | 27.229*** (2.555) | 27.267*** (2.563) | 27.313*** (2.557) |
| Post 73' period | 6.325*** (1.179) | 6.270*** (1.183) | 3.594*** (1.029) | 4.621*** (1.244) | -17.543*** (1.911) | -17.528*** (1.915) | -10.809*** (1.998) | -13.188*** (2.114) |
| 73' Casualties*post | 8.441*** (1.163) | 8.320*** (1.166) | 5.453*** (1.025) | 11.205*** (1.569) | -9.040*** (1.677) | -9.020*** (1.678) | -1.501 (1.863) | -16.600*** (2.072) |
| Terror victims | | 0.066 (0.144) | 0.105 (0.125) | 0.145 (0.114) | | -0.161 (0.313) | -0.422* (0.237) | -0.406** (0.200) |
| Eligible voters | | 0.031*** (0.009) | 0.037*** (0.008) | 0.030*** (0.010) | | -0.007 (0.012) | -0.002 (0.014) | -0.006 (0.013) |
| Constant | 3.047*** (1.006) | 3.048*** (1.007) | 3.055*** (1.007) | 3.067*** (1.008) | 25.623*** (2.363) | 25.589*** (2.368) | 25.526*** (2.370) | 25.532*** (2.372) |
| N | 581 | 581 | 424 | 424 | 581 | 581 | 424 | 424 |
| Clusters | 158 | 158 | 157 | 157 | 158 | 158 | 157 | 157 |

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Linear Regression with year fixed effects. standard errors clustered by locality. Sample size, and number of clusters presented in the bottom of the table.

Table A13: Casualties and Voting – Alternative Treatment Specification I

| 73' Casualties and Voting 1969-77 – Alternative Treatment I | | | | |
|---|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | Likud | Likud | Labor | Labor |
| >=75 th pctl casualties in 73' | 10.263*** (1.334) | 9.289*** (1.373) | 17.158*** (2.326) | 17.917*** (2.396) |
| Post 73' period | 7.603*** (1.140) | 7.543*** (1.142) | -24.195*** (1.680) | -24.168*** (1.686) |
| 73' Casualties in the post 73' period | 6.609*** (1.120) | 6.335*** (1.125) | -4.105*** (1.308) | -3.931*** (1.313) |
| Terror victims | | 0.000 (0.190) | | -0.280 (0.288) |
| Eligible voters | | 0.035*** (0.011) | | -0.020 (0.013) |
| Constant | 11.723*** (1.193) | 11.677*** (1.193) | 38.948*** (2.172) | 38.920*** (2.177) |
| N | 581 | 581 | 581 | 581 |
| Clusters | 158 | 158 | 158 | 158 |

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Linear Regression with year fixed effects. standard errors clustered by locality. Sample size, and number of clusters presented in the bottom of the table.

Table A14: Casualties and Voting – Alternative Treatment Specification II

| 73' Casualties and Voting 1969-77 – Alternative Treatment II | | | | |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | Likud | Likud | Labor | Labor |
| 73' casualties relative to eligible voters | 5.608*** (0.877) | 5.480*** (0.853) | 8.035*** (2.088) | 7.975*** (2.085) |
| Post 73' period | 8.197*** (1.142) | 8.206*** (1.152) | -23.067*** (1.814) | -23.063*** (1.811) |
| 73' Casualties in the post | 2.353** | 2.386** | -2.135* | -2.119* |
| 73' period | (1.034) | (1.037) | (1.128) | (1.126) |
| Terror victims | | 1.011*** (0.301) | | 0.475 (0.631) |
| Constant | 9.701*** (1.091) | 9.767*** (1.078) | 36.920*** (2.401) | 36.951*** (2.396) |
| N | 580 | 580 | 580 | 580 |
| Clusters | 157 | 157 | 157 | 157 |

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Linear Regression with year fixed effects. standard errors clustered by locality. Sample size, and number of clusters presented in the bottom of the table.

Table A15: Casualties and Voting – Alternative Treatment Specification Deaths Since YK War

| Casualties Since YK War and Voting 1969-77 | | | | | | |
|---|----------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|
| | Likud Pooled | Likud Pooled Controls | Labor Pooled | Labor Pooled Controls | Turnout Pooled | Turnout Pooled Controls |
| Casualties in 73' | 17.002*** (1.263) | 16.680*** (1.300) | 27.062*** (2.501) | 27.229*** (2.555) | -5.564*** (0.970) | -5.284*** (0.997) |
| Post 73' period | 6.204*** (1.184) | 6.270*** (1.183) | -17.543*** (1.911) | -17.528*** (1.915) | -6.235*** (1.215) | -6.212*** (1.218) |
| 73' Casualties*post | 8.610*** | 8.320*** | -9.040*** | -9.020*** | 1.050 | 1.068 |
| | (1.174) | (1.166) | (1.677) | (1.678) | (1.083) | (1.086) |
| Terror victims | | 0.066 (0.144) | | -0.161 (0.313) | | -0.410** (0.176) |
| Eligible voters | | 0.031*** (0.009) | | -0.007 (0.012) | | -0.008 (0.006) |
| Constant | 3.168*** (1.012) | 3.048*** (1.007) | 25.623*** (2.363) | 25.589*** (2.368) | 86.174*** (0.827) | 86.083*** (0.834) |
| N | 582 | 581 | 581 | 581 | 578 | 578 |
| Clusters | 159 | 158 | 158 | 158 | 157 | 157 |

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Linear Regression with year fixed effects. standard errors clustered by locality. Sample size, and number of clusters presented in the bottom of the table.

Table A16: Casualties and Voting – Alternative Treatment Specification Deaths Only During YK War

| Casualties Only During YK War and Voting 1969-77 | | | | | | |
|--|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|
| | Likud Pooled | Likud Pooled Controls | Labor Pooled | Labor Pooled Controls | Turnout Pooled | Turnout Pooled Controls |
| Casualties in 73' | 16.823*** (1.271) | 16.508*** (1.309) | 25.986*** (2.621) | 26.126*** (2.676) | -4.625*** (1.058) | -4.320*** (1.077) |
| Post 73' period | 6.232*** (1.169) | 6.301*** (1.168) | -18.142*** (1.989) | -18.131*** (1.993) | -5.555*** (1.226) | -5.530*** (1.230) |
| 73' Casualties*post | 8.538*** (1.164) | 8.244*** (1.156) | -8.471*** (1.721) | -8.457*** (1.721) | 0.118 (1.125) | 0.142 (1.126) |
| Terror victims | | 0.058 (0.148) | | -0.158 (0.316) | | -0.419** (0.176) |
| Eligible voters | | 0.031*** (0.009) | | -0.005 (0.012) | | -0.009 (0.005) |
| Constant | 3.445*** (1.006) | 3.321*** (1.001) | 26.624*** (2.534) | 26.591*** (2.539) | 85.460*** (0.855) | 85.368*** (0.857) |
| N | 582 | 581 | 581 | 581 | 578 | 578 |
| Clusters | 159 | 158 | 158 | 158 | 157 | 157 |

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Linear Regression with year fixed effects. standard errors clustered by locality. Sample size, and number of clusters presented in the bottom of the table.

Table A17: Casualties and Turnout

| 73' Casualties and Voting 1969-77 – Alternative Treatment II | | | | |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | Turnout Pooled | Turnout Pooled | Turnout 1973 | Turnout 1977 |
| 73' casualties relative to eligible voters | -5.564*** (0.970) | -5.284*** (0.997) | -5.304*** (1.003) | -5.284*** (1.002) |
| Post 73' period | -6.235*** (1.215) | -6.212*** (1.218) | -5.720*** (1.030) | -9.678*** (1.500) |
| 73' Casualties in the post | 1.050 (1.083) | 1.068 (1.086) | -4.986*** (1.166) | 7.219*** (1.549) |
| 73' period | | | | |
| Terror victims | | -0.410** (0.176) | -0.192 (0.123) | -0.332* (0.192) |
| Eligible voters | | -0.008 (0.006) | -0.012** (0.006) | -0.010* (0.005) |
| Constant | 86.174*** (0.827) | 86.083*** (0.834) | 86.136*** (0.835) | 86.102*** (0.837) |
| N | 578 | 578 | 424 | 421 |
| Clusters | 157 | 157 | 157 | 156 |

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Linear Regression with year fixed effects. standard errors clustered by locality. Sample size, and number of clusters presented in the bottom of the table.