How Threats of Exclusion Mobilize Palestinian Political Participation*

Chagai M. Weiss[†] Alexandra Siegel[‡] David Romney[§]

Accepted for Publication, The American Journal of Political Science

January 7, 2022 *Word Count:* 9.894

Abstract: Do exclusionary policies mobilize minority political participation? We theorize that the threat of exclusionary policies creates and resurfaces grievances that facilitate mobilization. To test our theory, we leverage Donald Trump's announcement of a peace plan for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which posed a threat to the citizenship status of Palestinian Citizens of Israel residing in the Triangle area adjacent to the West Bank. First, using over 170,000 posts from public Facebook groups and pages, we show that Trump's announcement was indeed a more salient political event for Triangle residents. Then, employing locality-level election data as well as records detailing the origin of citizens' joining a Jewish-Arab social movement, we use a difference-in-difference design to demonstrate that the threat to citizenship imposed by Trump's plan increased mobilization in the Triangle area. Our evidence from three distinct data sources suggests that threats of exclusion can mobilize minority political behavior.

^{*}Authors listed in reverse alphabetical order. The election data analyses of this study were preregistered on OSF (https://osf.io/wvup7/). We thank Guy Grossman for sharing Israeli census data, as well as Lotem Bassan-Nygate, Sarah Bush, Adeline Lo, Nadav Shelef, Sara Wallace Goodman, Jessica Weeks and workshop participants at UW-Madison, Harvard, Northwestern CAB meeting, and the POMEPS junior scholars virtual workshop.

[†]UW-Madison & Harvard University. 🖂: cmweiss3@wisc.edu.

[‡]University of Colorado - Boulder. 🖂: alexandra.siegel@colorado.edu.

[§]Brigham Young University. ⊠: mailto:david.romney@byu.edu.

Exclusionary policies—broadly conceptualized as laws and regulations that disproportionately restrict the rights of minority groups—are common in democratic countries around the world. They range widely in severity from restrictions of religious expression such as France's headscarf ban (Abdelgadir and Fouka 2020), to recent Indian reforms that will likely deprive many Muslims from their rights to citizenship (Wagner and Arora 2020). Such policies have long been adopted in socially diverse societies (Fouka 2019, 2020) and are often promoted by majority group politicians in order to increase homogenization or assimilation (Barak-Corren, Feldman, and Gidron 2018).

There are theoretical reasons to believe that exclusionary policies can politically mobilize or demobilize minority citizens (Oskooii 2018; Hobbs and Lajevardi 2019; Walker 2020a). However, it remains unclear whether the *threat* of an exclusionary policy in and of itself shapes minority political behavior. This gap is consequential; politicians often declare their policy intentions well before those policies materialize in the real world. Additionally, mobilization prior to the implementation of negative policies may help prevent those policies from ever becoming reality. Therefore, it is important to examine the political consequences of *proposed* exclusionary policies before they are implemented.

In this paper we test how the threat of an exclusionary policy undermining Palestinian citizenship status in Israel affected Palestinian political behavior. While threats to citizenship status represent a particularly severe exclusionary policy, a wide range of minority groups have faced such threats globally in recent years including ethnic Vietnamese Cambodians (Sperfeldt 2020), Indian Muslims (Wagner and Arora 2020), economic migrants in the Arab Gulf States (Babar 2020), the Roma in Europe (Van Baar, Ivasiuc, and Kreide 2019), and the Rohingya of Myanmar (Alam 2018). Since restrictions of Palestinian rights in Israel are ubiquitous and take many forms, we leverage a particularly severe exclusionary policy, to better understand how threats of exclusion affect minority political behavior.

Building on existing studies of political participation (Gurr 1970; Petersen 2002; Jasper 2011; Simmons 2014; Aytaç and Stokes 2019), we theorize that the threat of being targeted by an ex-

clusionary policy will mobilize members of minority communities to engage in politics.¹ Specifically, we argue that the threat of being targeted by an exclusionary policy can create, or resurface political grievances (Beissinger 2011; Jasper 2011; Simmons 2014). In turn, these grievances increase citizens' mobilizing emotions such as anger (Valentino et al. 2011; Van Zomeren 2013), indignation (Costalli and Ruggeri 2015), and resentment (Petersen 2002), which inform instrumental (Goldstone and Tilly 2001; Alimi 2007; Burden and Wichowsky 2014; Bray, Shriver, and Adams 2019), and expressive motivations for collective action (Schuessler 2000; Pearlman 2018; Schuessler 2021).

To test the observable implications of our theory, we focus on Palestinian citizens of Israel (PCIs), which have long suffered from formal and informal exclusion and discrimination (Enos and Gidron 2018; Weiss 2020). In January 2020, several weeks before a third round of successive elections in Israel, Donald Trump declared a new peace plan for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which posed a threat to the citizenship status of PCIs residing in the Triangle Area—a cluster of PCI villages adjacent to the West Bank (Landau and Tibon 2020). We leverage the timing of this threat, as well as its differential consequences for PCIs residing in different localities across the country, to identify the effects of a threat of exclusionary policy on minority formal and informal political behavior. We demonstrate that the threat to citizenship imposed by Trump's proposed policy mobilized PCIs in the Triangle area relative to those outside of the Triangle area. In our analyses of three unique data sources, we identify increases in political discourse on Facebook, turnout in national elections, and mobilization to a Jewish-Arab social movement, in response to the threat of exclusion. Together, our evidence suggests that threats of exclusion are a cause of minority political participation.

We make two contributions to the existing literature. First, we build on recent studies which consider the social effects of exclusionary policies (Fouka 2020; Abdelgadir and Fouka 2020),

¹As we emphasize in the conclusion, an important scope condition for our argument is that mobilization will likely only occur in instance where minorities are eligible to vote, and do not face severe and violent repression.

and provide evidence that the threat of an exclusionary policy, even before it is implemented, can affect minority political behavior. Second, we contribute to the literature on the causes of political participation (Aytaç and Stokes 2019; Schuessler 2021), and specifically the determinants of turnout (Bryan et al. 2011; Valentino et al. 2011; Davenport 2015) and social movement mobilization (Beissinger 2011; Pearlman 2013; Simmons 2016a), by demonstrating that the proposal of exclusionary policies can drive minority mobilization.

Exclusion and Political Behavior

A growing literature suggests that exclusionary policies have substantial effects on minority group members' social behavior (Fouka 2019; Abdelgadir and Fouka 2020). Additional research demonstrates how exclusionary legislation can increase the perceived legality of discrimination (Barak-Corren, Feldman, and Gidron 2020). Despite this, little is known about how exclusionary policies might affect minority political participation.

Early work attributes cross-sectional variation in Latinos' political knowledge and self-reported turnout to state level exclusionary policy atmospheres (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001; Pantoja and Segura 2003). Other research regarding exclusionary policies (operationalized as daily mentions of the Patriot Act in national news outlets), suggests that exclusionary policies mainly mobilize educated minorities (Cho, Gimpel, and Wu 2006). Similarly, survey evidence suggests that exposure to the criminal justice system and immigration enforcement can increase perceptions of injustice and systemic inequality amongst minorities, and in turn increase political mobilization (Walker, Roman, and Barreto 2020; Walker 2020a,b). These patterns suggest that the threat of exclusionary policies may have a mobilizing effect on minority citizens.

Evidence regarding the political effects of perceived discrimination similarly highlights the mobilizing potential of exclusionary policies. Though some studies link perceived discrimination with suppressed political participation (Diehl and Blohm 2001; Schildkraut 2005), or no changes in partisanship (Hopkins et al. 2020), other research suggests that discrimination can increase minority identification with specific parties (Kuo, Malhotra, and Mo 2017). This mixed pattern is examined by Oskooii (2016), whose theory draws a distinction between personal and political dis-

crimination, suggesting that the former decreases political engagement whereas the latter increases political engagement (Oskooii 2016, 2018). Seeking to adjudicate between these competing findings, we explore whether and why the threat of exclusionary policies affects political behavior.

Theoretical Expectations: Exclusionary Policies Mobilize Minorities

We theorize that the threat of being targeted by an exclusionary policy can create or rekindle political grievances (Beissinger 2011; Jasper 2011; Simmons 2014), that increase mobilizing emotions (Petersen 2002; Valentino et al. 2011; Van Zomeren 2013), as well as other instrumental and expressive motivations for collective action (Goldstone and Tilly 2001; Bray, Shriver, and Adams 2019; Schuessler 2000; Pearlman 2018; Schuessler 2021). Our theoretical expectations are rooted in a rich literature on the determinants of collective action (Petersen 2002; Schuessler 2000; Wood and Goodwin 2001; Jasper 2011; Valentino et al. 2011), and an understanding that similar motivations may drive diverse forms of political participation including voting and protest (Aytaç and Stokes 2019; de Mesquita and Shadmehr n.d.). Though the empirical focus of our paper is in identifying the causal effect that a threat of an exclusionary policy has on minority political participation, in this section we elaborate on the theoretical mechanisms driving this effect.

Threats of Exclusion Ignite Grievances

Theories of mobilization suggest that grievances motivate political behavior (Gurr 1970; Ivarsflaten 2008; Snow and Soule 2010; Beissinger 2011; Simmons 2014). Existing research differentiates between structural and incidental grievances (Bray, Shriver, and Adams 2019). The former relates to defining characteristics of a society (e.g. inequality), and the latter relates to specific events (e.g. the legislation of an exclusionary law). Incidental grievances have been shown to be effective in mobilizing citizens (Beissinger 2011; Bray, Shriver, and Adams 2019), since they increase the salience of structural grievances (Beissinger 2011), and generate moral outrage (Wood and Goodwin 2001).

Incidental grievances often relate to different social phenomena, including: government failure, corruption, economic hardships, and exclusion (Cammett, Salti et al. 2016). Social movement scholars argue that specific dynamics and events translate into mobilizing grievances, because they directly impact citizens' well-being, community, and identity (Simmons 2014, 2016b,a). Exclusionary policies are often designed to adversely affect minority citizens and their communities. Therefore, we expect them to generate and resurface grievances amongst minorities.

Grievances, Emotions, and Motivations for Collective Action

Situational grievances can mobilize citizens through multiple channels, relating to emotions, as well as expressive and instrumental motivations. Indeed, grievances can trigger emotional responses amongst minority group members (Van Zomeren 2013; Young 2021), and existing research demonstrates that a host of emotions, including: anger (Young 2021; Bishara 2015), indignation (Costalli and Ruggeri 2015), anxiety (Gadarian and Albertson 2014), fear (Jasper 2011), and resentment (Petersen 2002), mobilize citizens.² These emotions are often presented as "approach emotions," because they lead citizens to act in response to a given unsatisfying feature of their surroundings (Petersen 2002; Van Zomeren 2013; Pearlman 2013).

Emotions often operate in tandem, and identifying the independent effects of particular emotions is not the main objective of our paper. However, existing research shows that anger is a central mobilizing emotion (Valentino et al. 2011; Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013; Bishara 2015; Young 2021). Anger can be especially mobilizing for citizens who have experienced inequality and repression in the past (Young 2021). Similarly, indignation and resentment are powerful emotions (Petersen 2002; Costalli and Ruggeri 2015), and when they are associated with situational grievances, they can motivate minority citizens to overcome collective action problems and participate in the political process (Jasper 2011).

Political scientists have acknowledged that emotions are one of many mechanisms which translate grievances into political action (Aytaç and Stokes 2019; de Mesquita and Shadmehr n.d.). In line with this understanding, we expect emotions as well as instrumental and expressive motiva-

²In addition, Dornschneider (2020) demonstrates that beliefs about widespread emotions can also affect mobilization.

tions to account for increases in political participation. Indeed, minorities' grievances in response to the threat of an exclusionary policy, might compel them to participate in the political process in order to resist exclusion, and lead to policy change. These types of motivations are often described as instrumental (Burden and Wichowsky 2014; Davenport 2015; Jasper 2011; Nuamah and Ogorzalek 2021). Similarly, minorities' grievances might compel them to engage in politics in order to vocalize their opinions, and express their identities and values (Schuessler 2000, 2021). Such motivations are expressive and likely operate along instrumental and emotional mechanisms to mobilize minority citizens.

Observable Implications

Rather than disentangling emotional, instrumental, or expressive motivations for political participation, our main goal in this paper is to test whether—as our theory suggests—the threat of an exclusionary policy affects political behavior. We focus on three forms of political behavior: participation in political conversations in online social networks, voting, and enrollment in a social movement. Our main expectation is that the threat of an exclusionary policy will politically mobilize minority group members, and lead them to engage in politics at higher rates. We emphasize that this expectation should hold in cases where minorities are eligible to vote, and do not face a threat of severe violent repression. In the remainder of the paper, we use three sources of evidence to test the observable implications of our theory. However, before turning to our analyses, we provide a brief discussion of our empirical case.

Palestinian Citizens of Israel, the Triangle Area, and Trump's Deal of the Century

PCIs are the group of Palestinian Arabs who remained within the borders of Israel established in the aftermath of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War (Bashara 1993). Currently, just under 2 million PCIs live in Israel, and remain primarily concentrated in three locations: the northern part of Israel, the triangle areas near the "green line," and the southern part of Israel, populated mainly by Bedouin Arabs (Rekhess 2009). The legal rights and obligations of PCIs have varied drastically over time.

In the new Israeli state immediately following the 1948 War, PCIs were considered a security risk and were ruled under military law, thus lacking many of the rights other Israeli citizens enjoyed (Lustick 1980). Beginning in 1966, martial law was lifted and PCIs came to hold *de jure* the same citizenship rights as others. However, to date, *de facto* discrimination against PCIs is pervasive in a wide variety of contexts (Ghanem and Mustafa 2011), including: government spending (Peleg and Waxman 2011) and criminal justice (Fishman, Rattner, and Turjeman 2006; Grossman et al. 2016). Indeed, bias and discrimination have been identified in multiple arenas where Jewish state and non-state actors discriminate against PCIs (Zussman 2013; Bar and Zussman 2020).

Of particular interest to this study are exclusionary practices and policies that have targeted PCIs directly. In the last two decades, several such policies have been proposed and passed in Israel's legislature. These policies have been described by Jewish legislators as a means to strengthen Israel's national Jewish identity in response to the potential "demographic threat" posed by PCIs. These laws have posed a symbolic and material threat to PCIs' status as full citizens of the Israeli state. Perhaps most prominent is the "nation-state" law, passed in 2018. At its core, this law reiterated the Jewish nature of the state of Israel and demoted the Arabic language from an official language to one with "special status" (Fuchs 2020).

PCI responses to repression and exclusionary policies have varied since the creation of the Israeli state. Initially, under military rule, PCIs were politically demobilized (Ghanem and Mustafa 2011). However, since the 1970s, and especially during the 1990s, PCIs mobilized to advocate for their civil liberties, and protest the Israeli occupation (Smooha 2010; Haklai 2011). Existing research attributes increased PCI mobilization within Israel to the lifting of military rule (Ghanem and Mustafa 2011), institutional changes relating to political fragmentation (Haklai 2011), and persistent inequality (Smooha 2010). Related literature on Palestinian mobilization in the West Bank further points to Israeli and Palestinian authority repression (Høigilt 2013, 2015; El Kurd 2019a), checkpoints (Gade 2020), social cohesion (Pearlman 2011), educational institutions (Zeira 2019a,b), and socio-economic class (El Kurd 2019b), as determinants of mass-mobilization.

The Triangle Area

PCIs across Israel have been subject to a general exclusionary climate. However, PCIs living in the Triangle area have further dealt with propositions that make their citizenship a bargaining chip in peace negotiations with the Palestinian Authority. Specifically, to obtain control of West-Bank Jewish settlements and decrease the share of Palestinians within Israel's borders, some Israeli policy makers have proposed a land swap in which Israel would exchange control of Triangle localities for control of settlements (Ghanem and Mustafa 2011). This proposition has been promoted in recent years by Avigdor Lieberman—a right wing politician—whose political party Yisrael Beitenu made such land swaps a major part of their platform in the 2006 Israeli elections (Roffe-Ofir 2006). Naturally, Yisrael Beitenu's platform raised the profile of land swaps and caused anxiety among PCIs living in communities along the green line as indicated by public opinion data presented in page 1 of Section A of our Appendix.

Trump's Deal of the Century

With Trump's Peace Plan, Triangle residents' fears about land transfers would be given extra legitimacy. On January 28, 2020, slightly more than a month prior to a third round of Israeli national elections, Donald Trump convened a press conference together with Israeli Prime-minister Benjamin Netanyahu to reveal his 181-page "Peace to Prosperity" plan. Trump's plan, referred to by many political pundits as "The Deal of the Century," laid out a new American vision for future political arrangements between Israelis and Palestinians. The ultimate goal, as mentioned in the deal, was to provide "*Palestinians… with a path to a dignified national life, respect, security and economic opportunity*" while safeguarding Israeli security (White-House 2020). Several factors made this plan anathema to PCIs from the get-go. It was devised without the consultation of Palestinian officials, it came after several Trump administration controversies including moving the American embassy to Jerusalem and withdrawing financial support from UNRWA (Shaban 2018), and it differed from earlier U.S. positions on Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on the important dimension of boundaries and West-Bank settlements (Asseburg 2019). The "Peace to Prosperity" plan details a set of proposed policies to address different aspects of Palestinian-Israeli relations. These policies are all-encompassing, touching on borders, the status of Jerusalem, economic development, security apparatuses, possible connections between the West Bank and Gaza, regional trade, port facilities, natural resources, the status of prisoners and refugees, and education (White-House 2020). In the plan, Trump's administration laid out the "carrot" of massive investment in Palestinian territories, conditional on the satisfaction of a series of requirements relating to demilitarization and abandonment of international legal action against Israel and the U.S. Many additional aspects of the plan caused Palestinian negotiators dismay. For instance, the plan proposed a cluster of neighborhoods and villages on the outskirts of Jerusalem as a future capitol, and suggested that Palestinian refugees will unlikely return to Palestinian land under the plan (White-House 2020; Shaban 2018). Importantly for the main objective of our paper, Trump's plan also included reference to the potential transfer of ten localities in the Triangle Area from Israeli to Palestinian control (Landau and Tibon 2020; Figure A2 on page 3 in the Appendix maps these ten localities).

Trump's plan immediately evoked strong reactions and protests amongst Jews and Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza (Ben Kimon 2020; Blumental 2020). Palestinians almost unanimously rejected the proposal as one-sided (PSR 2020). In contrast, Israeli reactions were mixed. Many left-wing Israelis rejected the proposal, claiming that it violates liberal values, and diminishes the possibility of a two-state solution (Kremnitzer 2020). On the right, some Israelis welcomed the proposal as it provided an unprecedented opportunity to annex significant portions of the West Bank, while others rejected the deal because it legitimized the idea of a future Palestinian state (Ben Kimon 2020). Public opinion polls implemented several months after Trump's announcement, suggest that only 5% of Palestinians and 47% of Israeli citizens supported Trump's proposed plan. The same poll suggests that 47% of Israelis and 19% of Palestinian citizens of Israel support the potential transfer of ten localities in the Triangle Area from Israeli to Palestinian control (PSR 2020).

Anecdotal evidence suggests that the threat to the Israeli citizenship status of Triangle residents

evoked stark dissent amongst PCIs, especially those residing in the Triangle area (Itiel and Shalev 2020). Indeed, the "Deal of the Century" and the fate of PCIs residing in the Triangle area became key dimensions of the Arab Joint List's campaign during the third round of elections for the Israeli Knesset. Moreover, following Trump's declaration several protests erupted in the Triangle area (Khouri 2020), and some analysts argue that the Trump's declaration was a mobilizing factor for Palestinian voters (Rodinsky 2020).

Triangle Residents' Reactions to the Deal of the Century

Beyond anecdotal evidence, to what degree did the announcement of the "Deal of the Century" mobilize Triangle residents? Before we examine the effect of the announcement on voting behavior and social mobilization, we first need to establish that the announcement was indeed salient for Triangle residents. To assess the relative importance of the announcement for Triangle vs. non-Triangle residents, we collected over 170,000 posts from public Facebook groups and pages associated with the ten Triangle localities and ten non-Triangle localities matched to be similar to their Triangle counterparts on population and voting patterns.³ Using social media is particularly viable in our context; 77% of the Israeli population used social media in 2019 (Taylor and Silver 2019), and political discourse is common on the platform among Jewish and Arab Israelis alike. As a result, while of course by no means representative, Facebook data can provide realtime behavioral measures of the salience of political issues.

Facebook does not provide location metadata of individual users for privacy reasons. However, public Facebook groups and pages associated with towns and cities across the country are popular, enabling us to distinguish between Triangle and non-Triangle localities. To identify public pages and groups associated with each locality, we searched Facebook using Arabic-language keywords for each locality name. We excluded pages that were associated with businesses, schools, sports teams, and weather, as well as pages with fewer than 1000 followers. This left us with 71 pages from the 10 Triangle localities and 88 pages from the non-Triangle localities. These pages are

 $^{^{3}}$ We elaborate on the matching procedure in Section D.1 of the Appendix (page 26).



Figure 1: **Umm al-Fahm City Community Facebook page** – This is one of the public community Facebook pages and groups in our dataset associated with the Umm al-Fahm locality (one of the 10 Triangle localities).

primarily devoted to discussing community issues, with names like "Um al-Fahm City" or "Kafr Qasim Community Page." The "Um al-Fahm City" page is displayed in Figure 1.

After identifying these public Facebook pages and groups, we added them to the CrowdTangle database,⁴ and then used the CrowdTangle API to download all posts from the time each page was created until November 2020. This resulted in a dataset of 73,302 posts from the Triangle pages and groups and 99,674 posts from the non-Triangle pages and groups.

To determine the relative salience of the "Deal of the Century" in Triangle vs. non-Triangle localities, we used a dictionary-based approach to identify the weekly proportion of posts in each dataset that referenced Trump or the "Deal of the Century." To identify these topics in our data, we use a word2vec model (Mikolov et al. 2013), trained on the entire corpus of posts in our dataset.⁵ In particular, we begin with a set of Arabic seed words that we identify as being relevant

⁴CrowdTangle tracks data from public content across Facebook Pages and Groups, as well as Verified Profiles and public Instagram accounts. Researchers can access all posts from pages or groups that they manually add to the Crowdtangle platform.

⁵We chose to train our word2vec model on the entire corpus of posts in our dataset—rather than

to the concept of interest ("Trump" and "Deal of the Century"). We then used word embeddings to identify other words that are semantically related to our seed words in the data.⁶ These dictionaries are then limited to the 100 most similar words, and we remove overly general or irrelevant terms.

Manual reading of posts that are identified by our dictionary-based approach as referencing Trump or the "Deal of the Century" reveals that the vast majority of these posts are relevant. They include posts containing messages from community elites denouncing the deal, calls for local protests against the deal, and posts highlighting how the deal represents betrayal by Arab countries. Examining the relative volume of these posts over time in Triangle vs. non-Triangle localities reveals that Trump and the "Deal of the Century" were indeed more salient in Triangle localities. As Figure 2 suggests, discussion of the deal peaked on the day of the announcement and remained elevated in Triangle localities (relative to non-Triangle localities) for months afterwards.

The findings reported in Figure 2, establish that the announcement of Trump's "Deal of the Century" garnered more attention in Triangle localities than non-Triangle localities. This is in line with our expectations, given that Trump's plan imposed a threat to the citizenship status of Triangle residents. We now turn to test whether—as our theoretical framework predicts—Triangle residents' mobilized politically in response to threats on their citizenship status.

Empirical Strategy & Results

Testing our main theoretical expectations regarding the mobilizing effects of exclusionary policies is challenging for two reasons. First, exclusionary policies often target and threaten groups as a whole, limiting researchers' ability to find a suitable counterfactual conducive for causal inference. Second, oftentimes exclusion, and perceptions of discrimination, are endogenous to political using common pretrained embeddings such as Arabic Wikipedia—because there is a great deal of language specific to Facebook including hashtags and online slang that we wanted to be sure to capture in our dictionary-based approach.

⁶Semantic similarity here is based on these words appearing in similar contexts, and can be computed using cosine similarity on the word embedding space (Gurciullo and Mikhaylov 2017).



Figure 2: Salience of Trump & "Deal of the Century" in Public Facebook Posts – The top panel shows the difference in the weekly relative salience of Trump and the "Deal of the Century" in public posts on Facebook groups and pages associated with ten Triangle and ten non-Triangle localities. The bottom panel shows the weekly relative salience for Triangle and non-Triangle localities separately. Data was collected with the Crowdtangle API. The vertical line labeled "Deal of the Century" marks Trump's announcement.

attitudes and behaviors (Hopkins et al. 2020), making it hard to determine whether exclusion is a cause or an effect of suppressed political participation.

To sidestep these challenges, and identify the effects of exclusionary policies on minority political participation we focus on reactions to Donald Trump's "Deal of the Century." Specifically, we make use of the fact that the deal imposed a specific threat to the citizenship status of PCIs from the Triangle Area (Landau and Tibon 2020). The timing of Trump's declaration, as well as its differential consequences for PCIs across Israel, allow us to employ a difference-in-difference design, and recover the effects of exclusionary policies on voting and mass-mobilization.

As we acknowledge above, PCIs have been subject to many forms of exclusion since the inception of Israel. We leverage the "Deal of the Century," as it provides us with important analytical leverage to identify how threats of exclusion shape political behavior. While our analyses do not directly examine how all forms of exclusion shape political behavior, they do provide evidence that informs our understanding of exclusion and PCI mobilization within Israel.

Study I: The Effects of Exclusionary Policies on Voting

Voting in Israel

Our analysis of voting behavior in response to exclusionary policies focuses on three successive rounds of elections taking place between April 9, 2019 and March 2, 2020 (see Figure 3). Successive elections were the result of political gridlock, which inhibited the ability of parties to form governing coalitions (Levinson 2019; Press 2019). This gridlock led to a unique electoral dynamic in which parties and voters participated in very similar elections time after time.

Surprisingly, general turnout rates increased from one cycle to the next, reaching 71.52% in the third election. Political participation in PCI communities was no exception to this general trend. Indeed, turnout steadily increased in all Arab communities over the three successive elections. We now turn to consider whether voting behavior in PCI communities, and specifically in the Triangle area, was affected by the threat to citizenship imposed by Trump's "Deal of the Century".

Identification Strategy

We leverage two unique attributes of our case in order to identify the effects of exclusionary policies on minorities' voting behavior. First, the potential consequences of Trump's proposed plan impacted PCIs living in different geographic locations in diverging ways, as only Triangle residents were subject to a threat on their citizenship. We make use of this differential impact, which is conducive for a difference-in-difference design.

Second, the declaration of Trump's proposed plan took place weeks before a third round of successive election in Israel. Importantly for our analysis of voting records, the three recurring elections in Israel, taking place over less than one year, provide a unique opportunity to follow PCI voting patterns in very short time-intervals. The brief intervals between elections in Israel during 2019-2020, and the differential impact of Trump's proposed plan, allow us to trace and compare within locality changes in voting behavior, and attribute any over-time differences across triangle and non-triangle localities to the threat of citizenship imposed by Trump's plan. Unlike other longitudinal analyses of voting behavior where several years separate between each electoral cycle, in our case time-varying factors such as changing residential patterns, economic development, or government investment, are unlikely to confound our estimates.

Election I	Election II	Announcement	Election III
April 9, 2019	September 17, 2019	January 28, 2020	March 2, 2020

Figure 3: Timeline of Elections and Trump's Announcement

Leveraging these factors, we adopt a difference-in-difference design, which traces local changes in voting, within and outside the Triangle area. In our main analyses we focus on mixed and non-Jewish localities,⁷ which are most comparable to treated localities within the Triangle area that are

⁷Defined by national classification devised by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) in 2018.

populated exclusively by PCIs. We consider this to be a conservative approach, and we demonstrate the robustness of our findings to additional analyses of all Israeli localities.

By comparing within locality change in voting behavior, across treated (triangle) and controlled (non-triangle) localities, we recover the causal effect of a salient exclusionary policy on PCI voting behavior. However, this empirical approach requires two central identifying assumptions. The first is the common parallel trends assumption, and the second relates to the lack of unobservable time-varying differences between treated and controlled localities, between the second and third round of elections.

In Figure 4, we plot the average of our main outcome of interest—turnout—for both treated and controlled localities, during the three recurring elections in 2019-2020. This figure clearly demonstrates the existence of parallel trends in the pre-treatment period.⁸ In addition, we take two steps in order to address our second assumption regarding unobservable time-varying differences between treated and controlled localities. First, in order to minimize time-varying differences across localities, we focus on mixed and non-Jewish localities, omitting all Jewish localities from our main analyses. Second, we rule out the possibility that two potential time varying confounders contaminate our main effect. The time-varying confounders we consider are: the number of voting stations in treated and controlled localities, and the number and placement of PCI candidates from treated and controlled localities in the Joint Arab List during each election, which might serve as alternative explanations for increased turnout (for more information see Section B.2 in pages 5-7 of the Appendix). Taken together, these diagnostics further enhance our confidence that the underlying assumptions of our empirical approach are reasonable, and that employing a difference-in-difference model is suitable in this case.

⁸In pages 8-13 of the Appendix, we further demonstrate parallel trends of vote share for different parties, and unparallel trends for the full sample, which enhance the intuition behind our pre-registered choice to focus on mixed and non-Jewish localities.



Figure 4: **Parallel Trends of Turnout–** This plot compares average turnout rates in the ten Triangle localities mentioned in Trump's plan, with 145 mixed and non-Jewish localities, over three election cycles between 2019-2020.

Estimation Strategy

We adapt an OLS model, to identify the electoral effects of the threat to citizenship imposed on PCI Triangle residents, as a consequence of Trump's proposed plan. In our preferred specification, which was pre-registered prior to the third Israeli election in 2020, we estimate the following equation:

$$y_{ic} = \gamma_{triangle} + \eta_{post} + \zeta_{population} +$$
 $\psi_{triangle*post} + \varepsilon_{ic}$
(1)

Where y_{ic} denotes turnout in locality *i* during cycle *c*, γ is an indicator taking the value of 1 for the ten Triangle localities mentioned in Trump's plan,⁹ η is an indicator taking the value of 1 for all

⁹Kafr Qara, Ar'ara, Baha al-Gharbiyye, Umm al Fahm, Qalansawe, Tayibe, Kafr Qasim, Tira,

observations following Trump's declaration, ζ is a time-invariant control for population (published by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics in 2018), and ε is the model's error term which in our main specification is clustered at the locality level. Most importantly, our main quantity of interest is ψ , the difference-in-difference estimator, representing the effects of being a locality mentioned in Trump's plan, after the plan was declared. While cross-sectional differences between Triangle and non-Triangle localities are an interesting avenue for research, our difference-in-difference design attempts to control for such variation, in order to recover the effects of a threat of exclusion.

Results

We report our main results in Table 1. This table includes our pre-registered specification (Model 1), as well as 3 additional specifications: one with cycle and locality fixed effects (Model 2), one with these fixed effects as well as an alternative treatment indicator which takes a value of 1 for all 16 triangle localities regardless of whether they were mentioned in Trump's plan (Model 3), and one with these fixed effects that includes all Israeli localities in the analysis (Model 4).¹⁰ Across all models, it is apparent that Triangle localities experienced an increase in turnout following the declaration of Trump's plan.

Specifically, according to our pre-registered specification (Model 1), the threat to citizenship status of PCI Triangle residents, increased turnout in Triangle localities by approximately 2.4%. However, this finding should be interpreted with some caution, as it not precisely estimated with conventional levels of statistical significance (p = 0.129, two-tailed test).¹¹ In Model 2 we employ

Kafr Bara and Jaljulia.

¹⁰Note that fixed effect specifications do not include Triangle and Post indicators.

¹¹In Section B.4 of the Appendix on page 17, we further discuss the statistical significance of our main findings. Specifically, we emphasize that according to pre-registered simulations and power-calculations, our design is sufficiently powered to detect statistically significant effects which are larger that 2.5% (a quarter of a standard deviation). The fact that the point estimates in our main models presented in Table 1 are just below that, shed light on the precision of our estimated effects.

cycle and locality fixed-effects, and the results remain largely similar.¹² When considering all 16 triangle localities as treated regardless of whether they were mentioned in Trump's plan (Model 3), and observing all Israeli localities (Model 4), results remain robust, and are both statistically and substantively significant at conventional levels. In Section B.3 of the Appendix on pages 14-16, we demonstrate that our results are further consistent when employing a battery of pre-treatment controls from the 2008 census and when excluding Jerusalem (where a majority of Palestinian residents are not enfranchised to vote in national elections).

	Turnout					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		
Triangle	0.068					
	(0.028)					
Post	0.097					
	(0.006)					
Triangle * Post	0.024	0.024	0.048	0.117		
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.015)		
Pop Control	Yes	No	No	No		
Cycle FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Locality FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Cluster	Locality	Locality	Locality	Locality		
Sample	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish	Full		
Treatment	10 Localities	10 Localities	16 Localities	10 Localities		
Pre-Register	Yes	No	No	No		
N	405	465	465	3,639		

Table 1: Deal of the Century Effect on Turnout

More broadly, turnout in all non-Jewish localities increased by around 10% from the first to last cycle of elections. This 10% increase across all non-Jewish localities may be driven by a host of variables, including: national GOTV campaigns, voters' intention to put an end to recurring

¹²The n-size for models 2–4 is larger than our main specification because of the presence of 20 localities without 2018 population data in the main specification.

elections, or exposure to enhanced competitions which increases partisanship and polarization (Bassan-Nygate and Weiss 2020). However, the analyses presented in Table 1 suggest that the threat to citizenship imposed on PCI residents in the Triangle area, accounted for a portion of electoral mobilization during the final round of Israel's 2020 election.

Study II: The Effects of Exclusionary Policies on Mobilization

Our analysis of voting records suggests that exclusionary policies modestly shape minority voting behavior. But did the threat to citizenship imposed on PCIs from Triangle localities affect other forms of political participation? To answer this question we analyze the administrative records of a growing Jewish-Arab social movement. These records include information about the date and locality of origin of people expressing interest in joining the organization's listserv.

Jewish-Arab Mobilization In the Shadow of Conflict

The records we analyze were collected by a social movement founded in 2015 in an effort to protest intergroup solidarity during a cycle of violence in Israel-Palestine. The organization was originally founded by a host of activists from diverse affiliations. Their primary goal is to unify Israelis and PCIs from different social backgrounds and advocate for social justice reforms relating to an array of issues including higher minimum wages, ending police brutality, promoting peace, and addressing climate change.

One of the most salient characteristics of the organization is its firm commitment to intergroup cooperation in social and political struggles. This is evident from the organization's communications, which are written in Hebrew and Arabic, as well as from the movement's leadership, which is comprised of both Jewish and PCI activists. The organization routinely organizes protests, community information sessions, and online campaigns, to promote equality and social justice in Israel.

The Organizational Listserv

The organization operates through eight different geographical chapters in Israel (Northern Galilee, Western Galilee, Nazareth, Sharon-Triangle, Negev, Haifa, Tel-Aviv, and Jerusalem), as well as in seven different university campuses across the country (Ben Gurion University, Hebrew University, Tel-Aviv University, Haifa University, Sapir College, Oranim College, and Sapir College). Activities in each location are organized via local WhatsApp groups. In addition, the organization maintains an email based listserv through which it updates all affiliates about ongoing activities and campaigns across the country.

Potential activists can opt-in to the listserv online, or when recruited to join the organization in protests and other social events. For organizational purposes, the social movement keeps detailed records regarding the activists that join their listserv. The information they collect includes the names, email addresses, phone numbers, and origin of people who join the organization's listserv.¹³

We leverage the detailed records provided by the organization,¹⁴ in order to create a panel dataset counting the daily registrations for the movement's listserv in all Israeli localities between January 6, 2017, and August 13, 2020. Following our empirical approach from study I, in our main analyses we focus on mixed and non-Jewish localities. Our dataset for these localities is comprised of 203,980 observations, and 8,975 registrations. Since most locality-days take a value of 0 registrations, we construct our main outcome measure as a binary variable taking the value of 1 for any locality-day in which a local resident registered for the organization's listserv.

Identification Strategy

To analyze our data, we employ a difference-in-difference empirical strategy, similar to our analysis of voting records. However, when analyzing local registrations, our data are aggregated at the locality-day, rather than locality-cycle level. In Figure 5, we present monthly sign-up rates in Triangle and Non-Triangle localities. We aggregate our data by month for ease of presentation. Figure 5 demonstrates that in the period under investigation registration for the social movement's listserv in non-Triangle localities was more common than in Triangle localities. Additionally, trends in monthly registration are initially fairly stable, but start shifting immediately after Trump's dec-

¹³Though some people can choose to provide only partial information.

¹⁴Our data does not include identifiable information such as names, email addresses or phone numbers.

laration. Indeed, in the month of February, for the first time in the social movements' history, registration in Triangle localities was higher than in non-Triangle localities.



Figure 5: **Trends of Mobilization** – This figure presents monthly counts of registration for the social movement's listserv in Triangle (red) and non-Triangle (blue) localities. We present monthly observations for ease of interpretation.

Estimation Strategy

To identify how the potential threat to Triangle residents' citizenship affected political mobilization, We adapt an OLS model. In our preferred specification, we estimate the following equation:

$$y_{id} = \gamma_{triangle} + \eta_{post} + \zeta_{population} + \psi_{triangle*post} + \varepsilon_{id}$$
(2)

In this model y_{id} takes a value of 1 if a resident from locality *i* registered for the social movement's listserv during day *d*. γ is an indicator taking the value of 1 for the ten Triangle localities mentioned in Trump's plan, η is an indicator taking the value of 1 for all observations following Trump's declaration, ζ is a population control, and ε is the model's error term which in our main specification is clustered at the locality level. Most importantly, our main quantity of interest is ψ , the difference-in-difference estimator, representing the effects of being a locality mentioned in Trump's plan, after the plan was declared.

Results

In Table 2 we report our main results, with models that mirror those in Table 1. In model 1 we present a baseline difference-in-difference model with a control for population. Model 2 adds time (year, month, and week) and locality fixed effects and removes the population control. Model 3 includes the same fixed effects and an alternative treatment indicator for all triangle localities. Lastly, Model 4 includes those fixed effects in an analysis of all Israeli localities. Across all models, we find evidence that the threat to citizenship imposed on Triangle locality residents mobilized PCIs in the Triangle area. Our results across all models are precisely estimated at conventional terms (p < 0.05, two-tailed test). In Section C.2 of the Appendix on pages 20-25, we demonstrate that our results are largely robust to a host of alternative specifications.

Conclusion

In this paper we consider how the threat of an exclusionary policy affects minority political behavior. We theorize that the threat of being targeted by an exclusionary policy can resurface grievances which create emotional, instrumental, and expressive motivations that in turn increase political participation. To test the observable implications of our theory, we turn to the Israeli case, and focus on a particular threat to citizenship imposed on a subset of Palestinians residing in the Triangle area, as a consequence of Donald Trump's propose "peace plan" for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Leveraging the timing of this threat to citizenship, as well as its differential consequences for PCIs residing in different localities across the country, we identify the effects of a threat of exclusionary policy on minority political behavior using three distinct data sources.

We demonstrate that communities threatened by Trump's announcement increased discussion of Trump and the "Deal of the Century" on Facebook, turned-out to vote at modestly higher rates, and were more likely to enroll in a growing Jewish-Arab social movement. By identifying the mobilizing effects of exclusionary policies, we make two central contributions to the existing lit-

	Mobilization				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Triangle	0.000				
	(0.001)				
Post	0.012	0.017	0.017	0.006	
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.0004)	
Triangle * Post	0.020	0.022	0.013	0.028	
C	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	
Population Control	Yes	No	No	No	
Week FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Month FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Year FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Locality FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Cluster	Locality	Locality	Locality	Locality	
Sample	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish	Full	
Treatment	10 Localities	10 Localities	16 Localities	10 Localities	
Pre-Register	No	No	No	No	
N	177,660	203,980	203,980	1,597,624	

Table 2: Deal of the Century Effect on Mobilization

-

_

erature. First, we build on recent studies which consider the social effects of exclusionary policies (Fouka 2020; Abdelgadir and Fouka 2020), and provide evidence that the threat of an exclusionary policy, even before it is implemented, can affect minority political behavior. Second, we contribute to the literature on the causes of turnout (Bryan et al. 2011; Valentino et al. 2011; Burden and Wichowsky 2014; Davenport 2015), and social movement mobilization (Pearlman 2013; Simmons 2016a), by demonstrating that threats of exclusion are a potent cause of minority political participation.

Despite these contributions, our findings are not without limitations. First, results from our pre-registered specification regarding increased turnout in the Triangle are imprecisely estimated. We expect this to be an artifact of the decision to focus our analyses on non-Jewish localities, which are most comparable to the ten triangle localities mentioned in Trump's plan. We therefore cautiously interpret our findings from three different datasources pointing to one similar direction, to suggest that the threat of an exclusionary policy can mobilize minority voters.

Second, our outcome in study 2—enrollment into a social movement's listserv—might be viewed as a relatively low-cost form of political mobilization. Additionally, this outcome cannot reveal the extent to which minorities confronted with threats of exclusion are more likely to engage in costlier forms of contention such as protests. However, information and networks are an important pre-condition for political mobilization (Siegel 2009; Larson et al. 2019). Therefore, our finding suggest that in response to an exclusionary policy, Triangle residents took a first step of mobilization, and increased their enrollment into an information sharing network of political activists.

Lastly, we theorize about the threats of exclusionary policies broadly defined. However, our evidence comes from empirical analyses that identify the effects of one particular exclusionary policy relating to PCIs' citizenship status in Israel. In many regards, policies which can potentially revoke minorities citizenship status are an extreme form of exclusion, which warrants careful empirical attention. However, future research should consider the extent to which threats of other exclusionary policies within and outside of Israel, generate similar mobilizing effects—regardless

of whether or not they are ultimately implemented.

Our evidence suggests that in instances where minorities are eligible to vote and are permitted to protest without massive repression, mobilization might follow as a result of exclusion. Whether such mobilization leads to policy change is an interesting avenue for future research. However, historical accounts of PCI mobilization during the October 2000 protests, suggest that PCI mobilization motivated the Israeli government to convene an inquiry committee that proposed a set policy changes to address PCI grievances (Rekhess 2009). We encourage researchers to systematically investigate such dynamics in Israel, and beyond.

Together, our approach leveraging three distinct data sources suggests that the threat of being targeted by exclusionary policies can mobilize majority groups to engage in both formal and informal political participation. We hope that future work will replicate our findings in other divided societies and examine the impact of a broader set of exclusionary policies to improve our understanding of how these findings may generalize in diverse contexts.

References

- Abdelgadir, Aala, and Vasiliki Fouka. 2020. "Political Secularism and Muslim Integration in the West: Assessing the Effects of the French Headscarf Ban." *American Political Science Review*.
- Alam, Jobair. 2018. "The Rohingya of Myanmar: theoretical significance of the minority status." *Asian Ethnicity* 19 (2): 180–210.
- Alimi, Eitan. 2007. Israeli politics and the first Palestinian Intifada: Political opportunities, framing processes and contentious politics. Routledge.
- Asseburg, Muriel. 2019. "The "deal of the century" for Israel-Palestine." *German Institute for International and Security Affairs* 1.
- Aytaç, S Erdem, and Susan C Stokes. 2019. Why Bother?: Rethinking Participation in Elections and Protests. Cambridge University Press.
- Babar, Zahra R. 2020. "Economic migrants and citizenship in the GCC." In *Routledge Handbook OF Citizenship in the Middle East and North Africa*. Routledge.
- Bar, Revital, and Asaf Zussman. 2020. "Identity and bias: insights from driving tests." *The Economic Journal* 130 (625): 1–23.
- Barak-Corren, Netta, Yuval Feldman, and Noam Gidron. 2018. "The Provocative Effect of Law: Majority Nationalism and Minority Discrimination." *Journal of Empirical Legal Studies* 15 (4): 951–986.
- Barak-Corren, Netta, Yuval Feldman, and Noam Gidron. 2020. "Majority Nationalism Laws and the Equal Protection of Minorities: Experimental and Observational Evidence from Israel." *Working Paper*.
- Bashara, Azmi. 1993. "The Palestinian Minority in Israel." Teoria ve-Bikoret: 7-20.
- Bassan-Nygate, Lotem, and Chagai M Weiss. 2020. "Party Competition and Cooperation Shape Affective Polarization: Evidence from Natural and Survey Experiments in Israel.".
- Beissinger, Mark. 2011. "Mechanisms of Maidan: the structure of contingency in the making of the Orange Revolution." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 16 (1): 25–43.
- Ben Kimon, Elisha. 2020. "Trump's Peace Plan Divides the Settlers." Ynet. https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5742078,00.html.
- Bishara, Dina. 2015. "The politics of ignoring: Protest dynamics in late Mubarak Egypt." *Perspectives on Politics*: 958–975.
- Blumental, Itay. 2020. "Left Winger Activists Demonstrate: No to Annexation, No to Apartheid." *Ynet* (February).
- Bray, Laura A, Thomas E Shriver, and Alison E Adams. 2019. "Mobilizing Grievances in an Authoritarian Setting: Threat and Emotion in the 1953 Plzeň Uprising." *Sociological Perspectives* 62 (1): 77–95.

- Bryan, Christopher J, Gregory M Walton, Todd Rogers, and Carol S Dweck. 2011. "Motivating voter turnout by invoking the self." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 108 (31): 12653–12656.
- Burden, Barry C, and Amber Wichowsky. 2014. "Economic discontent as a mobilizer: unemployment and voter turnout." *The Journal of Politics* 76 (4): 887–898.
- Cammett, Melani, Nisreen Salti et al. 2016. "Popular Grievances and Perceptions of Socioeconomic Conditions in the Arab Region Prior to the Uprisings." In *Economic Research Forum Working Paper*. Number 1006.
- Cho, Wendy K Tam, James G Gimpel, and Tony Wu. 2006. "Clarifying the role of SES in political participation: Policy threat and Arab American mobilization." *The Journal of Politics* 68 (4): 977–991.
- Costalli, Stefano, and Andrea Ruggeri. 2015. "Indignation, ideologies, and armed mobilization: Civil war in Italy, 1943–45." *International Security* 40 (2): 119–157.
- Davenport, Tiffany C. 2015. "Policy-Induced risk and responsive participation: The effect of a son's conscription risk on the voting behavior of his parents." *American Journal of Political Science* 59 (1): 225–241.
- de Mesquita, Ethan Bueno, and Mehdi Shadmehr. N.d. "Motivation in Collective Action." . Forthcoming.
- Diehl, Claudia, and Michael Blohm. 2001. "Apathy, adaptation or ethnic mobilisation? On the attitudes of a politically excluded group." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 27 (3): 401–420.
- Dornschneider, Stephanie. 2020. Hot Contention, Cool Abstention: Positive Emotions and Protest Behavior During the Arab Spring. Oxford University Press.
- El Kurd, Dana. 2019a. *Polarized and Demobilized: Legacies of Authoritarianism in Palestine*. Oxford University Press.
- El Kurd, Dana. 2019b. "Who Protests in Palestine? Mobilization Across Class Under the Palestinian Authority." In *Palestine and Rule of Power*. Springer.
- Enos, Ryan D, and Noam Gidron. 2018. "Exclusion and cooperation in diverse societies: Experimental evidence from Israel." *American Political Science Review* 112 (4): 742–757.
- Fishman, Gideon, Arye Rattner, and Hagit Turjeman. 2006. "Sentencing outcomes in a multinational society: When judges, defendants and victims can be either Arabs or Jews." *European Journal of Criminology* 3 (1): 69–84.
- Fouka, Vasiliki. 2019. "How do immigrants respond to discrimination? The case of Germans in the US during World War I." *American Political Science Review* 113 (2): 405–422.
- Fouka, Vasiliki. 2020. "Backlash: The unintended effects of language prohibition in US schools after World War I." *The Review of Economic Studies* 87 (1): 204–239.

- Fuchs, Amir. 2020. "A decade of anti-Democratic legislation." Israeli Democracy Institute (January).
- Gadarian, Shana Kushner, and Bethany Albertson. 2014. "Anxiety, immigration, and the search for information." *Political Psychology* 35 (2): 133–164.
- Gade, Emily Kalah. 2020. "Social isolation and repertoires of resistance." *American Political Science Review* 114 (2): 309–325.
- Getmansky, Anna, and Thomas Zeitzoff. 2014. "Terrorism and voting: The effect of rocket threat on voting in Israeli elections." *American Political Science Review* 108 (3): 588–604.
- Ghanem, As' ad, and Mohanad Mustafa. 2011. "The Palestinians in Israel: The Challenge of the Indigenous Group Politics in the 'Jewish State'." *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 31 (2): 177–196.
- Goldstone, Jack A, and Charles Tilly. 2001. "Threat (and opportunity): Popular action and state response in the dynamics of contentious action." *Silence and voice in the study of contentious politics* 179.
- Grossman, Guy, Oren Gazal-Ayal, Samuel D. Pimentel, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2016. "Descriptive Representation and Judicial Outcomes in Multiethnic Societies." *American Journal of Political Science* 60 (1): 44-69.
- Gurciullo, Stefano, and Slava J Mikhaylov. 2017. "Detecting policy preferences and dynamics in the un general debate with neural word embeddings." In 2017 International Conference on the Frontiers and Advances in Data Science (FADS). IEEE pp. 74–79.
- Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. Why men rebel. Routledge.
- Haklai, Oded. 2011. Palestinian ethnonationalism in Israel. University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Hansen, Ben B, and Jake Bowers. 2008. "Covariate balance in simple, stratified and clustered comparative studies." *Statistical Science*: 219–236.
- Hobbs, William, and Nazita Lajevardi. 2019. "Effects of divisive political campaigns on the dayto-day segregation of Arab and Muslim Americans." *American Political Science Review* 113 (1): 270–276.
- Høigilt, Jacob. 2013. "The Palestinian spring that was not: The youth and political activism in the occupied Palestinian territories." *Arab studies quarterly* 35 (4): 343–359.
- Høigilt, Jacob. 2015. "Nonviolent mobilization between a rock and a hard place: Popular resistance and double repression in the West Bank." *Journal of Peace Research* 52 (5): 636–648.
- Hopkins, Daniel J, Cheryl R Kaiser, Efrén O Pérez, Sara Hagá, Corin Ramos, and Michael Zárate.
 2020. "Does perceiving discrimination influence partisanship among US immigrant minorities? Evidence from five experiments." *Journal of Experimental Political Science* 7 (2): 112–136.

- Itiel, Yoav, and Tal Shalev. 2020. "Rage in the Joint List regarding Population Transfer in Trump's Deal of the Century: "The Transfer will not go through"." *YNET* (January).
- Ivarsflaten, Elisabeth. 2008. "What unites right-wing populists in Western Europe? Re-examining grievance mobilization models in seven successful cases." *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (1): 3–23.
- Jasper, James M. 2011. "Emotions and social movements: Twenty years of theory and research." *Annual review of sociology* 37: 285–303.
- Khouri, Jackie. 2020. "Thousands Protest Against the Deal of the Century in Baka al-Gharbiya." *Haaretz* (February).
- Kremnitzer, Mordechai. 2020. "The Peace Plan and Revocation of Citizenship.". https://www.idi.org.il/blogs/deal-of-the-century/deal-of-the-century/29732.
- Kuo, Alexander, Neil Malhotra, and Cecilia Hyunjung Mo. 2017. "Social exclusion and political identity: The case of Asian American partisanship." *The Journal of Politics* 79 (1): 17–32.
- Landau, Noa, and Amir Tibon. 2020. "Trump's Peace Plan Calls for Two States, Settlement Freeze." *Haaretz* (January).
- Larson, Jennifer M, Jonathan Nagler, Jonathan Ronen, and Joshua A Tucker. 2019. "Social networks and protest participation: Evidence from 130 million Twitter users." *American Journal of Political Science* 63 (3): 690–705.
- Levinson, Chaim. 2019. "Israel Election: Gantz Caves, Netanyahu Pushed Aside or Third Election What Happens Next?" *Haaretz*.
- Lustick, Ian. 1980. Arabs in the Jewish state: Israel's control of a national minority. Vol. 6 Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Mikolov, Tomas, Kai Chen, Greg Corrado, Jeffrey Dean, L Sutskever, and G Zweig. 2013. "word2vec." URL https://code. google. com/p/word2vec 22.
- Nuamah, Sally A, and Thomas Ogorzalek. 2021. "Close to Home: Place-Based Mobilization in Racialized Contexts." *American Political Science Review*: 1–18.
- Oskooii, Kassra AR. 2016. "How discrimination impacts sociopolitical behavior: A multidimensional perspective." *Political Psychology* 37 (5): 613–640.
- Oskooii, Kassra AR. 2018. "Perceived discrimination and political behavior." *British Journal of Political Science*: 1–26.
- Pantoja, Adrian D, and Gary M Segura. 2003. "Fear and loathing in California: Contextual threat and political sophistication among Latino voters." *Political Behavior* 25 (3): 265–286.
- Pantoja, Adrian D, Ricardo Ramirez, and Gary M Segura. 2001. "Citizens by choice, voters by necessity: Patterns in political mobilization by naturalized Latinos." *Political Research Quarterly* 54 (4): 729–750.

- Pearlman, Wendy. 2011. Violence, nonviolence, and the Palestinian national movement. Cambridge University Press.
- Pearlman, Wendy. 2013. "Emotions and the Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings." *Perspectives on Politics*: 387–409.
- Pearlman, Wendy. 2018. "Moral identity and protest cascades in Syria." *British Journal of Political Science* 48 (4): 877–901.
- Peleg, Ilan, and Dov Waxman. 2011. *Israel's Palestinians: The conflict within*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Petersen, Roger D. 2002. Understanding ethnic violence: Fear, hatred, and resentment in twentieth-century Eastern Europe. Cambridge University Press.
- Press, Israel Hayom. 2019. "Ending the deadlock: 5 scenarios." Israel Hayom.
- PSR. 2020. "The Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Survey.". https://rb.gy/sfwto0.
- Rekhess, Elie. 2009. "Ha-Chevra Ha-Aravit Be-Yisrael." Abraham Fund.
- Rodinsky, Arik. 2020. "The Deal of the Century A New Political Card." *Israeli Democracy Institute* (March).
- Roffe-Ofir, Sharon. 2006. "Arab fury: Lieberman stain on democracy." Ynet (July).
- Rokem, Jonathan, Chagai M Weiss, and Dan Miodownik. 2018. "Geographies of violence in Jerusalem: the spatial logic of urban intergroup conflict." *Political Geography* 66: 88–97.
- Schildkraut, Deborah J. 2005. "The rise and fall of political engagement among Latinos: The role of identity and perceptions of discrimination." *Political Behavior* 27 (3): 285–312.
- Schuessler, Alexander A. 2000. "Expressive voting." Rationality and Society 12 (1): 87-119.
- Schuessler, Alexander A. 2021. A logic of expressive choice. Princeton University Press.
- Shaban, Ornar. 2018. "The Future of the Palestinian Cause in the Shadow of the" Deal of the Century"." *Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics, and Culture* 23 (2/3): 78–86.
- Siegel, David A. 2009. "Social networks and collective action." *American journal of political science* 53 (1): 122–138.
- Simmons, Erica. 2014. "Grievances do matter in mobilization." *Theory and Society* 43 (5): 513–546.
- Simmons, Erica S. 2016a. "Market reforms and water wars." World Politics 68 (1): 37-73.
- Simmons, Erica S. 2016b. *Meaningful resistance: Market reforms and the roots of social protest in Latin America*. Cambridge University Press.

- Smooha, Sammy. 2010. "Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel." Washington: United States Institute for Peace, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/PW67_Arab-Jewish_Relations_ in_Israel. pdf (erişim: 08.12. 2013).
- Snow, David A, and Sarah Anne Soule. 2010. A primer on social movements. WW Norton.
- Sperfeldt, Christoph. 2020. "Minorities and Statelessness: Social Exclusion and Citizenship in Cambodia." *international journal on minority and group rights* 27 (1): 94–120.
- Taylor, K, and L Silver. 2019. "Digital connectivity growing rapidly in emerging economies." *Pew Research*.
- Valentino, Nicholas A, Ted Brader, Eric W Groenendyk, Krysha Gregorowicz, and Vincent L Hutchings. 2011. "Election night's alright for fighting: The role of emotions in political participation." *The Journal of Politics* 73 (1): 156–170.
- Van Baar, Huub, Ana Ivasiuc, and Regina Kreide. 2019. *The securitization of the Roma in Europe*. Springer.
- Van Stekelenburg, Jacquelien, and Bert Klandermans. 2013. "The social psychology of protest." *Current Sociology* 61 (5-6): 886–905.
- Van Zomeren, Martijn. 2013. "Four core social-psychological motivations to undertake collective action." *Social and Personality Psychology Compass* 7 (6): 378–388.
- Wagner, Christian, and Richa Arora. 2020. "India's citizenship struggle: the Modi government pushes its nationalist agenda.".
- Walker, Hannah L. 2020a. Mobilized by Injustice: Criminal Justice Contact, Political Participation, and Race. Oxford University Press.
- Walker, Hannah L. 2020b. "Targeted: The Mobilizing Effect of Perceptions of Unfair Policing Practices." *The Journal of Politics* 82 (1): 119–134.
- Walker, Hannah, Marcel Roman, and Matt Barreto. 2020. "The ripple effect: The political consequences of proximal contact with immigration enforcement." *Journal of Race, Ethnicity and Politics* 5 (3): 537–572.
- Weiss, Chagai M. 2020. "SEGREGATION, INTEGRATION, AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS IN ISRAEL." *POMEPS Studies* 41: 70-75.
- White-House. 2020. "Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People.". https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/peacetoprosperity/.
- Wood, Elisabeth, and Jeff Goodwin. 2001. "The emotional benefits of insurgency in El Salvador." *The Social Movements Reader: Cases and Concept*: 143–152.
- Young, Lauren E. 2021. "Mobilization Under Threat: Emotional Appeals and Pro-Opposition Political Participation Online." *Political Behavior*: 1–24.

- Zeira, Yael. 2019a. "From the schools to the streets: education and anti-regime resistance in the West Bank." *Comparative Political Studies* 52 (8): 1131–1168.
- Zeira, Yael. 2019b. *The revolution within: State institutions and unarmed resistance in Palestine*. Cambridge University Press.
- Zussman, Asaf. 2013. "Ethnic discrimination: Lessons from the Israeli online market for used cars." *The Economic Journal* 123 (572): F433–F468.

How Threats of Exclusion Mobilize Palestinian Political **Participation**

Supplementary Information

Chagai M. Weiss, Alexandra Siegel, and David Romney

A	Land Swaps and Public Opinion Data	SI-1
B	Voting Analyses	SI-2
	B.1 Descriptive Statistics	. SI-2
	B.2 Modelling Assumptions	. SI-5
	B.3 Robustness Checks	. SI-14
	B.4 Power	. SI-17
	B.5 Vote Share Analyses	. SI-18
С	Mobilization Analysis	SI-20
	C.1 Descriptive Statistics	. SI-20
	C.2 Robustness Checks	. SI-20
D	Social Media Analysis	SI-26
	D.1 Matching	. SI-26

A Land Swaps and Public Opinion Data

As noted in the main text, a potential land swap and transfer of Triangle localities to the Palestinian authorities has been proposed as a policy in the early 2000s. Data from a nationally representative survey of PCIs in 2017 suggests that Triangle citizens were still worried about potential land-transfers even eleven years after Lieberman's initial campaign regarding land swaps. This survey was implemented by Sammy Samooha, and was made publicly available by the Israeli Democracy Institute: https://dataisrael.idi.org.il/. As reported in Figure A1, compared with 57% of non-Triangle PCIs, 80% of Triangle PCI residents in the survey sample reported their worry that the Triangle would be transferred from Israel to the Palestinian authority.



Figure A1: **Triangle residents are more worried about potential land transfers to Palestinian Authority.** Triangle sub-sample includes 149 survey respondents, and non-triangle sub-sample include 555 respondents.

B Voting Analyses

B.1 Descriptive Statistics

In Table A1, we provide descriptive statistics of the variables employed in our main analysis of non-Jewish and mixed Israeli localities. Table A2 reports similar statistics for all Israeli localities analyzed in Model 4 of Table 1 in the main text, and Models 4-6 in Table A5 below. The first four variables (Turnout, Arab Joint List VS, Likud VS, and Blue-White VS), are based on data retrieved from Israel's legislative election committee.¹⁵

We classify localities as either i) Jewish, or ii) Mixed and non-Jewish, based on data from the Israeli CBS. This data also includes locality level population statistics (2018), which we use in our analyses. Lastly, we employ data from the 2008 census to construct covariates employed in Table A5 below. However, it is important to note that the census, which was conducted 11 years before the elections we analyze, does not cover all localities.

Statistic	Ν	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Turnout	465	0.527	0.160	0.045	0.835
Arab Joint List VS	465	0.681	0.318	0.000	1.000
Likud VS	465	0.049	0.103	0.000	0.636
Blue-White VS	465	0.114	0.156	0.000	0.758
Triangle	465	0.065	0.246	0	1
Extended Triangle	465	0.103	0.305	0	1
Population 2018	405	23,959.800	90,450.840	177.000	919,438.000
Perc. Age 0-19	318	45.076	6.570	21.000	58.200
Perc. Age 65+	318	4.531	2.919	0.600	18.200
Perc. Age 85+	318	0.328	0.427	0.000	2.500
Perc. Academic	318	10.598	7.590	0.000	51.500
Perc. Employed	318	39.258	9.995	15.200	77.400
Housing Density	318	7.496	28.125	0.100	202.200
HH with Vehicle	318	63.309	11.533	19.800	93.600
Average Children per Women	318	2.767	0.378	1.400	3.600

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics - Non Jewish Localities

All variables starting with 'Perc. Age 0-19' are from the 2008 census.

In Figure A2 we present a map of Israeli localities. In this map, we depict the ten Triangle localities mentioned in Trump's peace plan in red. Other Jewish, Arab and mixed localities, as well as non-residential areas are depicted in grey.

¹⁵https://www.bechirot.gov.il/.



Figure A2: Israeli Localities – This map depicts Israeli localities. The ten treated Triangle localities which faced a threat to their citizenship status are shaded in red.

Statistic	Ν	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Turnout	3,639	0.712	0.118	0.045	1.095
Arab Joint List VS	3,639	0.090	0.253	0	1
Likud VS	3,639	0.214	0.186	0.000	0.873
Blue-White VS	3,639	0.327	0.230	0.000	0.780
Triangle	3,639	0.008	0.090	0	1
Population 2018	3,555	7,505.104	37,576.620	57.000	919,438.000
Perc. Age 0-19	3,126	37.382	10.193	8.000	69.200
Perc. Age 65+	3,126	7.378	6.451	0.000	73.700
Perc. Age 85+	3,126	0.909	1.639	0.000	18.900
Perc. Academic	3,126	25.057	13.812	0.000	68.900
Perc. Employed	3,126	66.038	14.364	15.200	98.500
Housing Density	3,126	2.157	11.142	0.000	202.200
HH with Vehicle	3,126	75.261	18.210	2.400	100.000
Average Children per Women	3,126	2.314	0.626	0.300	6.800

Table A2: Descriptive Statistics - All Localities

All variables starting with 'Perc. Age 0-19' are from the 2008 census.

B.2 Modelling Assumptions

In this section, we present several analyses to bolster the credibility of our modeling assumptions. First, in Table A3 we report results from a balance check implemented with the xBalance package in R (Hansen and Bowers 2008). In this test we compare triangle and non-triangle localities along eight different covariates, as well as values of pre-treatment turnout. In our balance check, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of similarity in the overall sample (p < 0.325), as well as all but one covariate (Age_0_19), where the individual corresponding *p* value is smaller than 0.1. These overall results enhance our intuition that our selected control group (mixed and non-Jewish localities), is a suitable counterfactual control group for our study.

	adj.diff	Z	
Population_2018	-2634.99	-0.08	
Houshold_Density	0.00	0.04	
Academic_Education	-1.26	-0.50	
Vehicle_Per_Family	3.62	0.94	
Employment	1.98	0.59	
Age_0_19	4.16	1.90	•
Age_65	-0.92	-0.94	
Age_85	-0.19	-1.31	
Trunout	0.05	1.26	

Table A3: Balance of Triangle and Non-Triangle Localities

As mentioned in the main text, our difference-in-difference model relies on an assumption that other than being mentioned in Trump's peace plan, there are no other time-varying unobservable differences between treated and controlled localities, which vary over the second and third Israeli election cycles. In Figure A3, we rule out the possibility that changes in turnout between the second and third election cycle, were driven by changes in the number of voting stations in treated and controlled localities. Indeed, as demonstrated in Figure A3, the number of voting stations remains stable in both treated and controlled localities over the three elections we observe.

An alternative concern might be that the increase in turnout within treated localities is driven by changes in party candidate lists, such that before the third election, candidates from treated localities were positioned higher in their party's list. In Table A4, we rule out this possibility by showing that during the second and third election cycles, the number and position of PCI MKs from the Joint Arab List who reside in the Triangle area remains identical. More so, we show that the general composition of the Joint Arab List remains similar between the second and third election cycle.

	List for the 22nd Knesset	List for the 22nd Knesset
1	Ayman Odeh	Ayman Odeh
2	Matanes Shkhada	Matanes Shkhada
3	Ahmed Tibi [†]	Ahmed Tibi [†]
4	Abas Mansour	Abas Mansour
5	Aida Touma-Souleiman	Aida Touma-Souleiman
6	Walid Taha †	Walid Taha †
7	Ofer Cassif	Ofer Cassif
8	Heba Yazbek	Heba Yazbek
9	Osama Saadi	Osama Saadi
10	Yousef Jabareen [†]	Yousef Jabareen [†]
11	Said al-Harumi	Said al-Harumi
12	Jabar Asakla	Jabar Asakla
13	Sami Abu Shehadeh	Sami Abu Shehadeh
14	Sondos Saleh	Sondos Saleh
15	Iman Khatib-Yasin	Iman Khatib-Yasin

Table A4: Arab Joint List Candidates for the 22 and 23 Knesset – † denotes MKs from the Triangle area.



Figure A3: **Voting Stations by Locality Type** – Count of voting stations per locality type, by election cycle (2019-2020.)

B.2.1 Parallel Trends

In Figure A4 we demonstrate parallel trends in turnout going back to the 2015 elections. We do not include these elections in our main analyses, since doing so may lead to confounding, due to time-varying unobservables between 2015 and 2019, which we seek to sidestep by focusing on three close election within one calendar year. However, we construe Figure A4 as further evidence that our parallel trends assumption is reasonable in this case.

In Figure A5, we consider parallel trends for our full sample. As noted in the paper, the model focusing on the full sample, is not our primary analysis because the Jewish localities in this full-sample model do not serve as a good counterfactual for our 10 threatened triangle localities. Figure A5 is evidence of this intuition, and shows that the parallel trends assumption is likely violated in the case of this model, even if the effect estimate for this model is in the same direction as the others.

In Figures A6 through A9, we consider parallel trends in vote share for the political parties of interest. We construe these figures as strong evidence of parallel trends in the pre-treatment period for party vote share across all parties. This enhances our intuition that employing a difference-in-difference model to analyze voting in mixed and non-Jewish localities is a suitable empirical approach.



Figure A4: **Parallel Trends of Turnout**– This plot compares average turnout rates in the ten Triangle localities mentioned in Trump's plan (red), with 145 mixed and non-Jewish localities (blue), over four election cycles between 2015-2020.



Figure A5: Parallel trends in turnout in the full sample.



Figure A6: Parallel trends in Blue-White vote share in the non-Jewish sample.



Figure A7: Parallel trends in Arab vote share in the non-Jewish sample.



Figure A8: Parallel trends in Labor vote share in the non-Jewish sample.



Figure A9: Parallel trends in Likud vote share in the non-Jewish sample.

B.3 Robustness Checks

B.3.1 Models with 2008 Census Controls

In Table A5, we present additional models, which include a battery of pre-treatment locality level controls. These controls are based on data from the 2008 census. One limitation of employing census data to create covariates, is that the census did not cover all localities, present in the 2019-2020 analysis. However, the results of these analyses, are still consistent with our main findings. Specifically, models 1-3 which focus on non-Jewish and mixed localities, and models 4-6 which consider all Israeli localities, provide a difference-in-difference estimator which is similar to the one reported in our main analyses in Table 1

B.3.2 Models Excluding Jerusalem

As noted in the main text, our main analyses compare voting in the ten treated Triangle localities, with voting in all other non-Jewish and mixed localities in Israel. However, Jerusalem which is considered as a mixed locality, resides a sizable Palestinian population which is not enfranchised to vote in National Elections (Rokem, Weiss, and Miodownik 2018). Since Jerusalem is systematically different from all other localities in our analyses, we consider additional models without the city. As reported in Table A6, results are substantively similar when employing this additional specification.

		Turnout			
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
0.053 (0.027)	0.026 (0.026)	0.018 (0.027)	-0.070 (0.027)	-0.055 (0.027)	-0.058 (0.027)
0.138 (0.011)	0.138 (0.011)	0.138 (0.011)	-0.0003 (0.002)	-0.0003 (0.002)	-0.0003 (0.002)
0.027 (0.016)	0.027 (0.017)	0.027 (0.017)	0.119 (0.015)	0.119 (0.015)	0.119 (0.015)
-0.0001 (0.002)	0.0003 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.0002)	0.001 (0.0002)	0.0002 (0.0002)
0.004 (0.002)	0.007 (0.002)	0.006 (0.002)	0.002 (0.0003)	0.002 (0.0003)	0.003 (0.0003)
	-0.138 (0.061)	-0.126 (0.061)		-0.098 (0.024)	-0.115 (0.031)
	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)		0.001 (0.0002)	0.001 (0.0002)
	0.161 (0.037)	0.146 (0.051)		0.055 (0.006)	0.046 (0.006)
		0.003 (0.004)			0.001 (0.0005)
		0.009 (0.007)			0.001 (0.001)
		-0.043 (0.031)			0.004 (0.002)
Yes Locality Non-Jewish No	Yes Locality Non-Jewish No	Yes Locality Non-Jewish No	Yes Locality All No	Yes Locality All No	Yes Locality All
	(1) 0.053 (0.027) 0.138 (0.011) 0.027 (0.016) -0.0001 (0.002) 0.004 (0.002) Ves Locality Non-Jewish No 318	(1) (2) 0.053 0.026 (0.027) (0.026) 0.138 0.138 (0.011) (0.011) 0.027 0.027 (0.016) (0.017) -0.0001 0.0003 (0.002) (0.002) 0.004 0.007 (0.002) -0.138 (0.061) -0.001 0.001) 0.161 (0.037) 0.161 (0.037) 0.161 Non-Jewish Non-Jewish No No 318 318	(1) (2) (3) 0.053 0.026 0.018 (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) 0.138 0.138 0.138 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 0.027 0.027 0.027 (0.016) 0.007 0.001 -0.0001 0.0003 0.001 (0.002) 0.007 0.006 (0.002) 0.007 0.006 (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) 0.004 0.007 0.006 (0.002) -0.138 -0.126 (0.061) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 -0.001 (0.001) 0.003 (0.004) 0.003 (0.004) 0.161 0.146 (0.007) 0.003 0.003 (0.007) -0.043 0.031) Ves Yes Yes Yes Locality Non-Jewish Non-Jewish No No No 318 318 </td <td>$\begin{array}{c cccc} (1) & (2) & (3) & (4) \\ 0.053 & 0.026 & 0.018 & -0.070 \\ (0.027) & (0.026) & (0.027) & (0.027) \\ 0.138 & 0.138 & 0.138 & 0.138 & -0.0003 \\ (0.011) & (0.011) & (0.011) & (0.002) \\ 0.027 & 0.027 & 0.027 & 0.119 \\ (0.016) & (0.017) & (0.017) & (0.015) \\ \hline & -0.001 & 0.003 & 0.001 & 0.001 \\ (0.002) & (0.002) & (0.002) & (0.002) \\ 0.004 & 0.007 & 0.006 & 0.002 \\ (0.002) & (0.002) & (0.002) & (0.003) \\ \hline & -0.138 & -0.126 \\ (0.061) & (0.061) & \\ \hline & -0.001 & -0.001 \\ (0.001) & (0.001) & \\ \hline & & 0.161 & 0.146 \\ (0.037) & (0.051) & \\ \hline & & 0.003 \\ (0.004) & \\ \hline & & 0.009 \\ (0.007) & -0.043 \\ (0.031) & \\ \hline & & Ves & Yes & Yes \\ Locality & Locality & Locality \\ Non-Jewish & Non-Jewish & Non-Jewish \\ Non & No & No \\ 318 & 318 & 318 & 318 & 3,126 \\ \end{array}$</td> <td>(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)0.0530.0260.018-0.070-0.055(0.027)(0.026)(0.027)(0.027)(0.027)0.1380.1380.1380.138-0.0003-0.0003(0.011)(0.011)(0.011)(0.012)0.002)(0.002)0.0270.0270.0270.0270.1190.119(0.016)(0.017)(0.017)(0.015)(0.015)0.001-0.00010.00030.0010.001(0.002)(0.002)0.0040.0070.0060.002(0.003)(0.003)-0.138-0.126-0.098(0.024)(0.024)-0.001-0.001(0.001)(0.001)(0.002)0.003(0.001)0.001(0.002)(0.002)0.0040.0070.0060.002(0.002)0.005-0.01(0.061)(0.024)(0.024)-0.031(0.061)(0.061)(0.004)(0.002)0.005-0.001(0.001)(0.005)(0.006)0.003(0.007)0.003(0.007)(0.006)0.003(0.007)-0.043(0.031)(0.001)YesYesYesYesYesLocalityLocalityLocalityAllNoNoNoNoNo3183183183183126</td>	$\begin{array}{c cccc} (1) & (2) & (3) & (4) \\ 0.053 & 0.026 & 0.018 & -0.070 \\ (0.027) & (0.026) & (0.027) & (0.027) \\ 0.138 & 0.138 & 0.138 & 0.138 & -0.0003 \\ (0.011) & (0.011) & (0.011) & (0.002) \\ 0.027 & 0.027 & 0.027 & 0.119 \\ (0.016) & (0.017) & (0.017) & (0.015) \\ \hline & -0.001 & 0.003 & 0.001 & 0.001 \\ (0.002) & (0.002) & (0.002) & (0.002) \\ 0.004 & 0.007 & 0.006 & 0.002 \\ (0.002) & (0.002) & (0.002) & (0.003) \\ \hline & -0.138 & -0.126 \\ (0.061) & (0.061) & \\ \hline & -0.001 & -0.001 \\ (0.001) & (0.001) & \\ \hline & & 0.161 & 0.146 \\ (0.037) & (0.051) & \\ \hline & & 0.003 \\ (0.004) & \\ \hline & & 0.009 \\ (0.007) & -0.043 \\ (0.031) & \\ \hline & & Ves & Yes & Yes \\ Locality & Locality & Locality \\ Non-Jewish & Non-Jewish & Non-Jewish \\ Non & No & No \\ 318 & 318 & 318 & 318 & 3,126 \\ \end{array}$	(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)0.0530.0260.018-0.070-0.055(0.027)(0.026)(0.027)(0.027)(0.027)0.1380.1380.1380.138-0.0003-0.0003(0.011)(0.011)(0.011)(0.012)0.002)(0.002)0.0270.0270.0270.0270.1190.119(0.016)(0.017)(0.017)(0.015)(0.015)0.001-0.00010.00030.0010.001(0.002)(0.002)0.0040.0070.0060.002(0.003)(0.003)-0.138-0.126-0.098(0.024)(0.024)-0.001-0.001(0.001)(0.001)(0.002)0.003(0.001)0.001(0.002)(0.002)0.0040.0070.0060.002(0.002)0.005-0.01(0.061)(0.024)(0.024)-0.031(0.061)(0.061)(0.004)(0.002)0.005-0.001(0.001)(0.005)(0.006)0.003(0.007)0.003(0.007)(0.006)0.003(0.007)-0.043(0.031)(0.001)YesYesYesYesYesLocalityLocalityLocalityAllNoNoNoNoNo3183183183183126

Table A5: Deal of the Century Effect on Turnout (2008 Census Covariates)

	Turnout				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Triangle	0.067	0.067	0.066	0.067	
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.019)	
Post	0.098	0.148	0.139	0.148	
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.002)	
Triangle * Post	0.023	0.023	0.026	0.023	
C	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.002)	
Population Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Edu Control	No	No	Yes	Yes	
Cycle FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Cluster	Locality	Locality	Locality	Locality + Cycle	
Sample	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish	
Pre-Register	No	No	No	No	
<u>N</u>	402	402	315	402	

Table A6: Deal of the Century Effect on Turnout (No Jerusalem)

B.4 Power

As noted in the main text, the results in Table 1 only approach conventional levels of statistical significance. It is important to acknowledge, that one limitation in our conservative empirical design relates to statistical power. Indeed, the decision to focus on mixed and non-Jewish localities over three successive elections in order to enhance the comparability of treated and controlled localities, and minimize concerns regarding temporal and cross-sectional confounding, comes at the cost of statistical power.¹⁶

We addressed this tradeoff as part of our pre-analysis plan. To do so, we considered the effect size which would allow us to identify positive changes in turnout, at conventional levels of statistical significance. Specifically, we used data from the first and second election cycles in 2019, to simulate diverging scenarios in which turnout in the Triangle area increased by 2%-4.5%. We based priors regarding effect sizes, on previous difference-in-difference models employed in the Israeli context of voting (Getmansky and Zeitzoff 2014).

In our pre-analysis plan (https://osf.io/wvup7/), we demonstrate that our models are suited to identify an increase in turnout of over 2.5% within Triangle localities, at conventional levels of statistical significance (p < 0.05). As our point estimate is right below this threshold, the p values presented in the main text, only approach conventional levels of statistical significance. However, the consistent results from our multiple robustness checks, as well as the significant results from models which increase sample size by considering all Israeli localities, increase our confidence in the papers' main finding.

¹⁶Moreover, we avoid analyzing data at the voting station level, due to concerns relating changes in the assignment of voters' to stations within localities between elections.

B.5 Vote Share Analyses

In the main text, we consider the effects of a threat of exclusion on minority turnout. In this section, we turn to consider whether exclusionary policies affect local support for different parties. Specifically, we employ similar difference-in-difference models, to focus on local support fo Likud (the party closely associated with Trump's declared plan and the exclusionary policy within it), its main competitor (at the time) Blue-White, and the Joint Arab list. Identifying null-effects across the board, would provide suggestive evidence that exclusionary policy increases political participation, without shaping the electorate's political preferences. However, identifying significant changes in local support for different parties would suggest that exclusionary policy might have important effects, which go well beyond increased turnout.

The results presented in Table A7 indicate that beyond impacting turnout, exclusionary policies might shape the electorate's preferences. However, in the Israeli case of PCI voting, this impact materialized in a somewhat unexpected fashion. In contrast to our expectation that Trump's plan would increase support for the Joint Arab List—the party most vocal against Trump's proposed plan and the threat to citizenship it imposes on Triangle residents—it appears that the party's vote share in the Triangle area did not change during the third election (Column 1 in Table A7). Likewise, we do not detect any effect on Likud vote share—an unsurprising finding given the limited support for Likud in PCI localities.

	Joint List	Likud	Blue-White
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Triangle	0.245	-0.053	-0.122
	(0.042)	(0.010)	(0.015)
_			
Post	0.191	-0.0005	-0.038
	(0.013)	(0.004)	(0.009)
Triangle * Post	-0.008	-0.003	0.020
	(0.025)	(0.003)	(0.007)
Population Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cycle FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cluster	Locality	Locality	Locality
Sample	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish
Pre-Register	No	No	No
Ν	405	405	405

Table A7: Deal of the Century Effect on Party Vote Share

However, our difference-in-difference estimator for changes in Blue-White vote share is positive and statistically significant. The positive effect we identify suggests that PCI voters confronting a threat to their citizenship status (i.e. Triangle residents) responded by supporting the incumbent party's main competitor. Specifically, rather than voting for a sectorial party, which may or may not join forces in building an alternative coalition to the incumbent, Triangle voters were more likely to support a large non-sectorial party which at the time posed a political threat to the incumbent closely associated with Trump's peace plan.¹⁷

Note that we also consider a vote share model with locality and cycle fixed effects, seen in Table A8. The results using these models change very little, both in terms of substantive effects and in terms of statistical significance.

	Joint List	Likud	Blue-White
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Triangle			
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Post			
1 000	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Triangle * Post	-0.012	-0.003	0.025
	(0.025)	(0.003)	(0.006)
Cycle FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Locality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cluster	Locality	Locality	Locality
Sample	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish
Pre-Register	No	No	No
N	465	465	465

Table A8: Deal of the Century Effect on Party Vote Share

¹⁷It is important to emphasize that in general Blue-White vote share decreased in both treated and controlled localities between the second and third election cycle. Therefore, the most precise interpretation of Model 3 in Table A7, would suggest that Trump's decleration limited the decline in support for Blue-White, among Triangle voters, in comparison to non-Triangle voters, during the third election cycle.

C Mobilization Analysis

C.1 Descriptive Statistics

In Table A9 we report descriptive statistics of all variables used in our mobilization analysis. Note that this Table considers only mixed and non-Jewish localities which are the subject of our main analysis. As evident in Table A9, the average joining rate in our data for any given locality is less than 1. Indeed, in most locality-days no recruitment to the social movement's listserv takes place. For that reason, we consider a binary measure, rather than a count measure as our main outcome of interest.

Statistic	Ν	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Daily Join (Count)	203,980	0.044	2.663	0	805
Daily Join (Binary)	203,980	0.006	0.076	0	1
Triangle	203,980	0.065	0.246	0	1
Extended Triangle	203,980	0.103	0.304	0	1
Population 2018	177,660	23,959.800	90,339.360	177.000	919,438.000
Perc. Age 0-19	139,496	45.076	6.559	21.000	58.200
Perc. Age 65+	139,496	4.531	2.915	0.600	18.200
Perc. Age 85+	139,496	0.328	0.426	0.000	2.500
Perc. Academic	139,496	10.598	7.578	0.000	51.500
Perc. Employed	139,496	10.798	7.195	0.600	35.400
Housing Density	139,496	7.496	28.081	0.100	202.200
HH with Vehicle	139,496	63.309	11.514	19.800	93.600
Average Children per Woman	139,496	2.767	0.377	1.400	3.600

Table A9:	Descriptive	Statistics -	Non Je	ewish L	localities
-----------	-------------	--------------	--------	---------	------------

All variables following 'Perc. Age 0-19' are from the 2008 census.

C.2 Robustness Checks

In Table A10, we consider mobilization models that include the combination of locality-week fixed effects. These are immensely saturated models—these models introduce 35,185 fixed effects into the Non-Jewish analysis and 275,578 fixed effects into the full sample model. In spite of this, our results are largely the same, with the result for the Non-Jewish sample just barely insignificant at the 0.1 level.

In Table A13, we examine our results when restricting our data range of analysis to just 2019–2020, similar to the date range of our study 1 analysis. There are no changes in the direction or significance of results.

In Table A11 we provide additional models where we introduce locality-level demographic controls based on the 2008 Israeli census. Aside from including these demographic variables as controls, we also provide models (4) and (8) which look at the interaction of these census variables with year fixed effects, to account for the possibility of different trajectories for different localities. Doing so does not impact our main findings. In addition, in Table A12, we demonstrate that our main models are robust when considering Logit, rather than OLS models.

Throughout the paper, and up to this point in the Appendix, we model our outcome as dichotomous rather than using the number of sign ups. In Table A14, we examine results from negative binomial models using the count data, and the positive coefficient on our interaction term, while not directly interpretable, indicates a similar finding to the model in the paper. In Figure A10, we show more interpretable results in the form of expected first differences for triangle localities, prevs. post-Deal of the Century, which indicates approximately 0.1 more signups per day for these localities.

	Mobilization		
	(1)	(2)	
Post	0.061	0.008	
	(0.021)	(0.003)	
Triangle * Post	0.239	0.292	
	(0.147)	(0.145)	
Locality-Week Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	
Sample	Non-Jewish	Full	
Ν	203,980	1,597,624	

Table A10: Deal of the Century Effect on Mobilization

				Mobilizat	ion			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Triangle	0.001 (0.003)	0.003 (0.002)	0.005 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.003 (0.001)	0.003 (0.001)	0.003 (0.001)	0.004 (0.001)
Post	0.021 (0.002)	0.021 (0.002)	0.021 (0.002)	0.021 (0.002)	0.006 (0.0005)	0.006 (0.0005)	0.006 (0.0005)	0.006 (0.0005)
Triangle*Post	0.019 (0.004)	0.019 (0.004)	0.019 (0.004)	0.023 (0.004)	0.028 (0.004)	0.028 (0.004)	0.028 (0.004)	0.027 (0.004)
Perc. Academic	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.0004)		0.0001 (0.00002)	0.0001 (0.00002)	0.0001 (0.00003)	
Perc. Employed	0.0003 (0.0002)	0.0004 (0.0002)	0.0003 (0.0002)		-0.0001 (0.00002)	-0.0001 (0.00002)	-0.0001 (0.00002)	
Housing Density		-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.005)			-0.0001 (0.001)	0.003 (0.002)	
HH with Vehicle		-0.001 (0.0003)	-0.0003 (0.0002)			-0.0001 (0.00002)	-0.00005 (0.00002)	
Average Children per Women		-0.006 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.006)			-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.0003)	
Perc. Age 0-19			0.001 (0.001)				-0.0001 (0.00004)	
Perc. Age 65+			0.001 (0.002)				0.0001 (0.00004)	
Perc. Age 85+			0.025 (0.012)				-0.0004 (0.0001)	
Week FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year * Census FE	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Cluster	Locality	Locality	Locality	Locality	Locality	Locality	Locality	Locality
Sample	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish	All	All	All	All
Pre-Register	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
<u>N</u>	139,496	139,496	139,496	139,496	1,371,272	1,371,272	1,371,272	1,371,272

Table A11: Deal of the Century Effect on Mobilization (2008 Census Covariates)

		Mobilization	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Triangle	0.293	0.297	0.530
	(0.408)	(0.414)	(0.304)
Post	1.302	2.170	2.460
	(0.169)	(0.494)	(0.496)
Triangle*Post	0.697	0.714	0.577
	(0.220)	(0.218)	(0.212)
Week FE	No	Yes	Yes
Month FE	No	Yes	Yes
Year FE	No	Yes	Yes
Pop Control	No	No	Yes
Cluster	Locality	Locality	Locality
Sample	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish
Pre-Register	No	No	No
Ν	203,980	203,980	177,660

Table A12: Deal of the Century Effect on Mobilization (Logit)

	Mobilization				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Triangle	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.002	0.009
-	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Post	0.008	0.042	0.048	0.048	0.013
	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.001)
Triangle*Post	0.018	0.018	0.017	0.010	0.023
-	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Week FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pop Control	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Cluster	Locality	Locality	Locality	Locality	Locality
Sample	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish	Full
Treatment	10 Localities	10 Localities	10 Localities	16 Localities	10 Localities
Pre-Register	No	No	No	No	No
N	91,450	91,450	79,650	79,650	716,260

Table A13: Deal of the Century Effect on Mobilization, 2019–2020

Table A14. Deal of the Century	Fffect on Mobiliz	vation Negative B	inomial Models
Table A14. Deal of the Centur		Lation, regarive D	monnar widucis

-

	Mobilization			
	(1)	(2)		
Triangle	1.060	1.655		
	(0.135)	(0.162)		
Post	1.227	1.274		
	(0.097)	(0.049)		
Triangle * Post	0.656	0.801		
	(0.306)	(0.383)		
Population Controls	Yes	Yes		
Sample	Non-Jewish	Full		
Ν	177,660	1,559,460		
Log Likelihood	-8,694.232	$-27,\!877.080$		
θ	0.008 (0.0003)	0.004 (0.0001)		
Akaike Inf. Crit.	17,398.470	55,764.170		



Figure A10: First Differences, Triangle Localities Pre- vs. Post-Deal of the Century. This figure shows the first differences for triangle localities pre- vs. post-deal of the century, using the model in column 1 of Table A14

D Social Media Analysis

D.1 Matching

Our social media analysis required using matching to find Arab localities similar to our treatment localities. We tested two different matching models, one with Mahalanobis distance and the other using propensity score matching. We ended up using the first because of its better match on 2018 population. We report our matching results, which motivate the selection of localities for the Facebook analysis in Table A15. In Table A16 we provide a list of matched Triangle and non-Triangle localities.

Variable	Original	Mahalanobis	PSM (Logit)
2018 Population	1.115	0.176	0.295
Turnout, April 2019	0.713	0.376	-0.505
Turnout, September 2019	1.033	0.952	-0.476

Table A15: Matching Results, Standardized Mean Difference

	Triangle	Non-Triangle (Match)
1	JALJULYE	KAFAR YASIF
2	KAFAR BARA	MAS'ADE
3	KAFAR QASEM	MUGHAR
4	AR'ARA	ARRABE
5	QALANSAWE	KAFAR KANNA
6	KAFAR QARA	REINE
7	UMM AL-FAHM	SHEFAR'AM
8	TIRE	HURA
9	TAYIBE	TAMRA
10	BAQA AL-GHARBIYYE	SAKHNIN

Table A16: Triangle and Matched Non-Triangle Localities